The opinion
McMILLEN, District Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from Conclusions of Law 11(a), 12 and 13, and the preliminary injunction entered in the above ease.
The loyalty oath required for statewide candidates in Illinois' as I read it, complies substantially with the requirements of Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 , 92 S.Ct. 1332 , 31 L.Ed.2d 593 (April 8, 1972) and is permissible under these circumstances. It reads:
I, ................... do swear that I am a citizen of the United States and the State of Illinois, that I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with any communist organization or any communist front organization, or any foreign political agency, party, organization or government which advocates the overthrow of constitutional government by force or other means not permitted under the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of this State; that I do not directly or indirectly teach or advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States or of this State or any unlawful change in the form of the governments thereof by force or any unlawful means.
[1971, Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 46, § 7-10.1]
Although this oath is not phrased or punctuated as precisely as we might prefer, its purport is clear enough and it should be construed to be constitutionally valid if possible. The extent that the Illinois version may go beyond the language specifically approved by the United States Supreme Court is a matter of semantics, not a matter of substance. As I understand the defendants’ position, the oath is not required for candidates whose oath is prescribed by the Federal Constitution.
Furthermore, I believe that some geographical distribution of signatories on petitions is justified before a political party is entitled to participate in a state-wide election. The distribution required by the Illinois statute is a reasonable one, fulfilling the legislature’s apparent desire not to saddle the citizens of the entire state with unjustified expenses, complexity of issues, and burdens on election judges. Giving voters outside of Cook County some voice in this determination conforms with, rather than violates, the principles of one-man one-vote recognized by the majority of the Supreme Court in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 , 89 S.Ct. 1493 , 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).