holding that “while there are some circumstances when prior notice may be necessary, the limited procedural circumstances for which Section 5505 was being invoked in this case did not demand prior notice.” (footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “while there are some circumstances when prior notice may be necessary, the limited procedural circumstances for which Section 5505 was being invoked in this case did not demand prior notice.” (footnote omitted)
- finding Batson claim unpreserved when counsel failed to “specifically raise a Batson challenge, the trial court [J-84-2024] - 45 did not interpret the objection as raising a Batson challenge, and counsel did not press the issue” even after counsel “questioned the Commonwealth’s practice of striking” Black jurors
- concluding that “[s]ince appellees were present and heard at the [reconsideration] hearing, … the notice requirement [of Section 5505] was satisfied.” (citation omitted; emphasis in original)
- rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure testimony of a pathologist as to specific cause of death, and emphasizing that “PCRA defense experts’ opinions on the specific cause [J-58AB-2019] - 29 of death say little about appellees’ intention−which was a very different question. . . . [A]ppellees controlled the circumstances surrounding [the victim’s] death every step of the way and . . . those circumstances fully supported a finding of an intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion subject to the following reservations.
The majority indicates that requests for rules to show cause are commonly made ex parte. See Majority Opinion, op. at 418-19. I believe that, where reasonably practical, prior notice should be given to opposing parties, and thus, I would not endorse ex parte practice as normative.
Separately, I differ with the majority’s conclusion that the jury charge, taken as a whole, satisfied the requirements of Commonwealth v. Huffman, 536 Pa. 196 , 638 A.2d 961 (1994). As I find this case to be on all fours with Commonwealth v. Speight, 578 Pa. 520 , 854 A.2d 450 (2004), however, I join the majority’s ultimate disposition of the jury-instruction claim *45 based upon precedent. See generally Commonwealth v. Cox, 581 Pa. 107 , 149 n. 3, 863 A.2d 536 , 561 n. 3 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that Speight implicitly overruled Huffman in these circumstances); Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 250 , 912 A.2d 268, 297 (2006) (Saylor, J. concurring) (“[A]fter Cox , it seems to me that the only surviving vestige of Huffman is that which remains to be litigated in the federal courts under due process theory.” (citing Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 425-28 (3d Cir.2005))).