The opinion
BROWN (G. A.), P. J.
I dissent.
The primal principle of statutory construction requires the ascertainment of the intent of the legislative body that enacted the charter provision. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of legislative intent, the court must turn to the words of the statute for the answer. (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [ 217 P.2d 1 ], cert. den. 340 U.S. 879 [ 95 L.Ed. 639 , 71 S. Ct. 117 ].) Of particular significance is the cardinal rule set forth in City of San Jose v. Lynch (1935) 4 Cal.2d 760, 766 [ 52 P.2d 919 ]: “It is axiomatic that every provision of the charter should be construed in the light of the whole instrument and of each and every other provision thereof, keeping in view at all times the intent underlying the same. ... \ . . General and special provisions in a statute should stand together, if possible, but where general terms or expressions in one part of a statute are inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part the particular provisions must govern, unless the statute as a whole clearly shows the contrary intention. . . . ’ ” (Italics added.)
These cardinal principles have been ignored by the lead opinions. It is plain beyond cavil that the language in section 1218 of the charter, “. . . each utility shall apply all annual profits thereafter remaining to rate *469 reductions, ...” (italics added) was intended to assure cheap water rates to users. This express purpose cannot be gainsaid.
The last full sentence of section 1218 is equally explicit. As part of that sentence it is stated: “No municipally owned utility shall be operated for the benefit of other municipal functions nor be used directly or indirectly as a general revenue-producing agency for the City, but may pay to the City such amounts of money, in lieu of property and other taxes normally placed upon private business enterprises, as the Council may provide by ordinance . . . .” (Italics added.) The expressed intent is clear, explicit and unambiguous. Its manifest purpose is to prevent the City from riding on the backs of water users to pay the general expenses of the City by raising revenue from the Water Division in excess of what City services to that agency cost, thus reducing or eliminating the profits which the agency might otherwise make and apply to the reduction of water rates.
It is evident that construing section 1218 as a whole, the dominant purpose and intent is to supply water at cheap rates, and to that end section 1218 prohibits the City from assessing the Water Division for the benefit of other municipal functions or directly or indirectly using the Water Division as a general revenue-producing agency. It is obvious that if the Water Division is assessed at a rate which pays for the services it receives from the City, represented by the City portion of tax rates “normally placed upon private enterprises” (§ 1218 of the charter), ipso facto any amount of money collected by the City over that amount is an amount collected for use to support City services and operations for other purposes, thus using the Water Division as a revenue-producing agency in violation of the specific provisions of section 1218.
Once the legislative intent is ascertained, it is fundamental that the court’s task is to effectuate the purpose of the law as expressed in that intent. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 .) The endeavor must be to produce a “reasonable result consistent with [the] legislative purpose . . . .” (E.g., Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 620 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 354 P.2d 657 ].) As the court stated in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247 , 259: “Once a particular legislative intent has been ascertained, it must be given effect ' “even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.”’ (Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ].) As we stated nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613 [ 234 P. 883 ]: ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some *470 other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” ’ ”
Obviously the factors utilized to establish the county tax rate have no necessary relation to the cost of operating the Water Division nor upon the amount of City taxes assessed against private enterprise. Permitting the City to use the arbitrary basis to establish the amount of the in lieu tax in effect places no limitation upon the amount of in lieu charge that may be collected by the City under section 1218. Thus, the interpretation urged by the City and adopted by the lead opinions that the section authorizes the City to use the county tax rate negates and renders meaningless the above referred to express limitations in section 1218 and ignores the cardinal rule that a statute should be construed to give effect to every provision, if possible. (See 58 Cal.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 99, pp. 465-468, § 100, pp. 468-469, § 133, pp. 529-530.)
Accordingly, I would hold that construing section 1218 as a whole and in order to effectuate its clear intent and purpose requires that the express limitations set forth in section 1218 qualify the authority of the City to assess in lieu taxes. The City should be limited in the amounts of money it can raise from the Water Division to that amount which will not produce revenue for the benefit of other municipal functions or revenue in excess of the amounts needed to pay for the services supplied by the City to the Water Division, plus amounts required for reserves for depreciation and amortization of bonds. Thus, the total in lieu tax rate for each fiscal year would be limited to the City portion of tax rates “normally placed upon private business enterprises” (§ 1218 of the charter), including new taxes. Accordingly, the measure of the amount the City may receive from the Water Division for each fiscal year would be the amount received from private business enterprises for the same fiscal year. This, of course, would include the City’s portion of taxes collected pursuant to the provisions of Proposition 13. Presumptively, for any fiscal year the City portion of tax rates normally placed upon private business enterprises pays for the services and benefits received from the City. To the extent that sections 4-801, 4-802 and 4-803 of article 8, chapter 4 of the Fresno Municipal Code are in conflict with this standard, they should be held invalid.
The lead opinions rely upon the principle that a city charter may not be interpreted to contain implied limitations on the exercise of power. (City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw (1949) 34 Cal.2d 595, 599 [ 212 P.2d 894 ].) Referring to the language in section 1218, the City contends that there is no express limitation on the City’s power to assess in lieu taxes. *471 The majority misses the mark as section 1218 does contain the express limitations I have discussed. As mentioned, those limitations are the express limitation pertaining to the application of profits to rate reductions and the limitation contained in the phrase prohibiting the operation of the division for the benefit of other municipal functions and prohibiting the division’s use as a general revenue-producing agency for the City. Significantly, these limitations are found in the same sentence as the authority to assess in lieu taxes. Since the limitations are express and not implied, the authorities cited by the majority are inapplicable.
More specifically, the lead opinion relies upon the placement of the word “but” to read out the express limitations in section 1218 and to conclude “[t]he in lieu payment, then, is an exception to the charter mandate that a municipally owned utility may not be used as a general revenue-producing agency.” However, this conclusion is clearly contrary to the express limitations contained in the section and renders them meaningless. Moreover, it ignores the time-honored principles of interpretation I have mentioned. The court should ascertain and give effect to the intent of the enactors in interpreting the section as a whole and construing every part of the section to give effect to every provision thereof. Specifically, our Supreme Court has instructed in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247 , 259: “ ‘ “. . . The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” ’ ” (See also Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ].)
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 5, 1982, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Brown (G. A.), P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 6, 1983. Bird, C. J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.