holding defendant’s right to summon witnesses in his behalf under section 8 of article II of the Illinois Constitution and sixth amendment of United States Constitution requires reasonable funds for expert assistance where expert opinion may have been crucial in the case and defendant’s lack of funds prevented him from presenting to the jury evidence which might have established innocence
How later courts described this case
- holding defendant’s right to summon witnesses in his behalf under section 8 of article II of the Illinois Constitution and sixth amendment of United States Constitution requires reasonable funds for expert assistance where expert opinion may have been crucial in the case and defendant’s lack of funds prevented him from presenting to the jury evidence which might have established innocence
- stating that the value of an expert’s services lies primarily in his preparation
- “[I]n certain instances involving indigents, the lack of funds with which to pay for the witness will often preclude him from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him from offering a defense.” (Emphasis added.)
- recognizing the right on constitutional grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Kaczmarek, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1067 (1993)
Defendant relies on People v. Watson (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 228, which is factually distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Underwood, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that this case must be remanded for a new trial because of the trial court’s error in precluding defendant from offering evidence that a similar traveler’s check was forged .and cashed after defendant was in custody, but I cannot agree with the extension of the defendant’s right to the assistance of expert witnesses which is accomplished by the majority opinion.
The General Assembly has (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 113 — 3(e)) provided for public payment of a maximum of $250 as fees to necessary expert witnesses for indigent defendants in capital cases. It seems to me that this legislative expression of the extent to which the State must provide expert witnesses for indigent defendants is binding upon this court unless we are prepared to say that either the State or Federal constitutions give such persons a greater right. No United States Supreme Court decision of which I am aware so holds. The majority opinion in this case cites decisions of that court (Gideon, Griffin) in which the rights there proclaimed were found to be constitutionally guaranteed, but the majority here do not specifically hold the newly announced rights of indigent defendants to expert witnesses at public expense to be constitutional in nature. Nor, in the absence of a compelling Supreme Court decision, could such conclusion easily be reached, for we have indicated the contrary in three recent cases, in the last of which the opinion was adopted only last term, (People v. Nash, post 275; People v. Myers, 35 Ill.2d 311 ; People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470 ), none of which are even mentioned, much less over-ruled, by the majority herein. If these decisions are correct, as I believe them to be, the sole remaining basis for the majority opinion is that those who concur therein disagree with the wisdom of the legislative action in that they regard it as too restrictive. That such is the case seems further evident from the “trust” announced by the majority that “the General Assembly will consider the expansion of section 113- — 3(e) to include noncapital cases where expert testimony is deemed by the trial judge to be crucial to a proper defense.”
I do not quarrel with the majority premise that the bare right to subpoena expert witnesses is of little value, for without an opportunity for pre-trial preparation the value of the expert’s testimony would be, in all likelihood, substantially reduced. And, while an expert may undoubtedly be subpoenaed and compelled to appear, it seems to me there are substantial constitutional questions (deprivation of property without due process) as to whether a court may compel him to expend his time and apply his expertise to pretrial examination of documents without compensating him therefor. But these factors do not invalidate the legislative limitation upon the type of case in which expert assistance shall be available to indigent defendants unless the right thereto is constitutional in dimension. There are, in fact, compelling reasons for such limitations. It would be unrealistic to assume that the holding in the majority opinion that there are “instances in noncapital cases” where experts must be furnished indigent defendants will result in other than a request for such assistance by such defendants in most cases involving issues upon which an expert could conceivably be employed. We are aware, from the substantial number of records coming before us, that the trial courts frequently refer defendants to clinics or private physicians for the purpose of pretrial competency examinations. In all of such cases, presumably, the indigent defendant will now also be entitled to examination by his own psychiatrist or psychologist or both. Cases involving signatures, finger prints, chemical analyses and ballistics, to mention only a few, will automatically qualify as may every case in which an expert in any field appears for the State either as a witness or assists in pretrial investigative or preparatory activities.
While it is not my intention to make an ad terrorem presentation, it seems proper to point out the substantial arguments against the result reached by the majority without any constitutionally imposed necessity for so doing, and in the face of legislative decision to the contrary.
I would abide by our earlier indications in Nash, Myers and Carpenter and uphold the trial court’s action in denying defendant’s request for expert assistance.