holding defendant’s right to summon witnesses in his behalf under section 8 of article II of the Illinois Constitution and sixth amendment of United States Constitution requires reasonable funds for expert assistance where expert opinion may have been crucial in the case and defendant’s lack of funds prevented him from presenting to the jury evidence which might have established innocence
How later courts described this case
- holding defendant’s right to summon witnesses in his behalf under section 8 of article II of the Illinois Constitution and sixth amendment of United States Constitution requires reasonable funds for expert assistance where expert opinion may have been crucial in the case and defendant’s lack of funds prevented him from presenting to the jury evidence which might have established innocence
- stating that the value of an expert’s services lies primarily in his preparation
- “[I]n certain instances involving indigents, the lack of funds with which to pay for the witness will often preclude him from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him from offering a defense.” (Emphasis added.)
- recognizing the right on constitutional grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Kaczmarek, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1067 (1993)
Defendant relies on People v. Watson (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 228, which is factually distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice House, specially concurring.
I concur with the holding that defendant under the circumstances of this case was entitled to have an expert witness examine the questioned document, but I do believe that the majority has gone too far when it apparently equates the legislative pronouncement in section 113 — 3(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 113 — 3(e),) with the requirements of due process. I feel that the defendant in this case had the right to have the check examined by handwriting and fingerprint experts, but T do not think he is “entitled to a reasonable fee for the purposes of hiring a questioned-document examiner”.
Section 113 — 3(e) provides, “In capital cases, in addition to counsel, if the court determines that the defendant is indigent the court may, upon the filing with the court of a verified statement of services rendered, order the county treasurer of the county of trial to pay necessary expert witnesses for defendant reasonable compensation stated in the order not to exceed $250 for each defendant.” The legislature has seen fit to limit this provision to capital cases. To expand the philosophy and force of this section to cover this case is to legislate by judicial metaphysics.
We have held on several occasions that the refusal to furnish an indigent defendant with an expert witness or witnesses in addition to those already produced by the People on the same issue does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing that the People’s expert witness or witnesses gave other than their honest and unprejudiced opinion based upon their special knowledge and examination. People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470 (psychiatrist) ; People v. Myers, 35 Ill.2d 311 (psychiatrist); People v. Nash, post 275 (ballistics).
In this case the People produced no expert testimony as to whether defendant signed the check or whether his fingerprints appeared on it. Under the facts of this case, we have decided that there is a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt and that such opinion evidence is necessary in order to convict defendant. It seems to me our opinion should go no further than this. To hold that defendant should hire a questioned-document examiner is in effect asking him to prove himself innocent. If the People do produce such testimony, then the rulings in Carpenter, Myers and Nash become operative.
For still another reason, I think that the majority opinions has gone beyond the requirements of due process of law. It holds that the indigent defendant should be provided with funds to hire a questioned-document examiner. This is in sharp contrast with the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to counsel, which has never been construed to mean that funds should be paid to an indigent defendant with which to pay counsel of his choice. The legislature in section 113 — 3(b) has provided that the trial court shall appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant and not that the court furnish funds with which an indigent may retain counsel.
I think this court should go no further than to state that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and reverse and remand the cause for a new trial. In my opinion, the majority has exceeded the bounds of judicial restraint in ordering the county treasurer to pay the fees of an expert witness hired by defendant.