The opinion
M. J. Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority has joined the growing number of Court of Appeals panels in disagreement with the opinion I authored in People v Sturdivant, 91 Mich App 128 ; 283 NW2d 669 (1979). Without finding it necessary to reiterate *489 my position I will respectfully note my dissent from the majority’s rejection of Sturdivant . See People v White, 102 Mich App 156 ; 301 NW2d 837 (1980), in which I qualified somewhat the Sturdi-vant rationale.
In this case the seminal fluid analysis places the defendant within a group comprising 36 percent of the population. I would hold that its probative value could not outweigh the prejudicial effect and that therefore the trial court erred in admitting this blood-type evidence.
However, as in Sturdivant , reversal is not required. In this case the victim testified to her several opportunities to observe the defendant at the time of the attack and positively identified him at trial. I therefore conclude that the error injected by the admission of the blood-type evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standards set forth in People v Christensen, 64 Mich App 23, 32 ; 235 NW2d 50 (1975).
I concur in affirmance.