The opinion
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring:
The majority states that when the trial court has not complied with the requirements of Rule 605, a defendant is not barred from appealing the sentence in question. For that reason, the majority allows the defendant to challenge the propriety of the final order entered November 2, 1989. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s order of March 16, 1990, not the order of November 2, 1989. She cannot challenge the order of November 2, 1989, unless either the provisions of Rule 606(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 606(c)) are complied with by defendant or this court sua sponte grants a late notice of appeal.
The issues raised by defendant are not of constitutional dimension and, unless this court addresses the granting of the late notice of appeal issue, the defendant’s appeal should be dismissed without addressing the merits.
As stated in People v. Covington (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 105, 108 , 257 N.E.2d 106 , 108:
“[T]he allegation of the petition that the court failed to give defendant such advice did not raise a question of constitutional dimension. Our rule stems from the dictates of good practice rather than constitutional command, and where the question has arisen it has been held that the failure of a court to advise of the right to appeal is not a denial of due process or equal protection.”
In People v. Schultz (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 844 , 327 N.E.2d 334 , defendant was sentenced on February 20, 1970, to three years’ probation. Defendant’s probation was subsequently revoked and he was sentenced to the penitentiary in November 1972. In March 1973, the appellate court allowed a late notice of appeal as to the sentence entered in November 1972. Defendant first sought to attack the February 20, 1970, sentence asserting the trial court failed to properly admonish him. The appellate court stated:
“[P]ursuant to Supreme Court Rule 606(c), this court vested itself with jurisdiction only as to the revocation of probation and sentencing proceedings which had occurred in November, 1972. Consequently, we are without jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s first contention.” Schultz, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 848 , 327 N.E.2d at 337 .
This appeal may be heard on the merits because the issues presented and record show an excuse for failure to file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 606(b). (134 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).) The time limitations of Supreme Court Rule 606(c) have been met. As stated by this court in In re K.M. (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 915, 919 , 389 N.E.2d 188 , 190-91:
“[W]e interpret the decisions to require us to hear appeals covered by Rule 606(b) and (c) when the ends of justice would be served thereby and the appellant has shown an intent to appeal during the 6-month period by filing a document so indicating but fails to precede the filing with a request for leave to do so.”
Balsar, cited by the majority, does not stand for the proposition, a defendant, without complying with the time limitations of Supreme Court Rule 606 (134 Ill. 2d R. 606), can at any time appeal a final order because the trial court failed to admonish him of his right to appeal.
The record does show a sufficient basis to permit the trial court to modify the conditions of probation and, for that reason and the reasons set forth above, the trial court should be affirmed.