noting that this court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant’s mental or psychological impairments may not be mitigating enough to overcome the evidence in aggravation
How later courts described this case
- noting that this court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant’s mental or psychological impairments may not be mitigating enough to overcome the evidence in aggravation
- “This court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant’s mental or psychological impairments may not be inherently mitigating ***.”
- “A judge or jury considering evidence of [mental or psychological impairments] at sentencing might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.”
- we presume that the sentencing court considered all mitigating evidence absent some indication, other than the sentence itself, to the contrary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FITZGERALD, specially concurring:
Based on the facts and the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, I agree with the majority that the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty in this case was appropriate and not fundamentally unjust. I write separately because I believe that, while the majority reached the correct decision, it did not apply the proper standard of review.
The majority advocates a standard of review which is neither “pure abuse of discretion nor a pure de novo standard.” 222 Ill. 2d at 34. This standard is derived from the principle that, in death penalty cases, this court should give some deference to the fact and credibility determinations of the fact finder, while at the same time subjecting the record to intense scrutiny. I agree that the fact finder’s assessment of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses is entitled to some deference. I likewise agree that, because of the seriousness of death penalty proceedings, the record should certainly be subject to “intense scrutiny.” However, I do not believe that the fashioning of a standard of review that falls somewhere between abuse of discretion and de novo is necessary or sufficient to achieve these goals.
The legislature of this state has assigned to this court the duty, “independent of any procedural grounds for relief,” to “overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment *** if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case.” 720 ILCS 5/9—l(i) (West 2004). This is a great responsibility. Indeed, this court must answer the ultimate question of whether a defendant should receive a death sentence. Because of the seriousness of the issue, and the fact that the decision, in the end, is ours alone to make, our review should be de novo.
This court has previously adopted a de novo standard of review when charged with deciding the “ultimate question” of whether a criminal defendant’s confession is voluntary. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). In G.O., we stated that we would “accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we will review de novo the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary.” G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50 . In reaching this conclusion, we relied on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1997), which was rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 , 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
In Ornelas, the Supreme Court recognized the need for de novo, or “independent appellate review,” of the “ultimate determinations” of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697 , 134 L. Ed. 2d at 919 , 116 S. Ct. at 1662 . In D.F., the Seventh Circuit advocated de novo, or independent, review regarding the “ultimate question” of the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession. D.F., 115 F.3d at 419 . It is significant that the de novo standard has been deemed appropriate in cases where extremely serious decisions must be made by reviewing courts — decisions involving fundamental rights that impact a person’s liberty. See also People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 223 (2003) (applying a de novo standard of review to the ultimate question of whether the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly granted, where the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, asserted that he was unreasonably seized in violation of the fourth amendment); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 (2001) (applying a de novo standard to the “ultimate determination” of whether the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated). The United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, and this court demonstrated a reluctance to apply a deferential standard of review under these grave circumstances. The same reluctance is appropriate here.
Yet, the weight of our decision is not the only factor which supports the application of the de novo standard. Drawing from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ornelas, in D.F., the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the question of voluntariness involved a consideration of the facts admitted at trial and assessed by the fact finder, but ultimately was a question of law. D.F., 115 F.3d at 418 . It likewise recognized that voluntariness is a fluid concept “given content through case-by-case adjudication,” which required “uniformity of meaning and consistency of application.” D.F., 115 F.3d at 417 . The court stated that reviewing courts must conduct an independent review under these circumstances in order to “ ‘maintain control of, and to clarify’ the controlling legal principles.” D.F., 115 F.3d at 417 , quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697 , 134 L. Ed. 2d at 919 , 116 S. Ct. at 1662 .
The considerations made by the Seventh Circuit in D.F., and adopted by this court in G.O., are readily applicable to death penalty cases. As in determining voluntariness of a confession, when determining whether a sentence of death is appropriate, this court must consider the facts admitted into evidence and the trial court or jury’s assessment of those facts. However, while this court should pay some deference to the fact finder’s assessments, this court, by statute, is bound to determine the ultimate question of whether the facts presented at trial are sufficient to warrant imposition of the death penalty, such that the death penalty is not fundamentally unjust as applied to a particular defendant. Like voluntariness, fundamental injustice is a fluid concept which can only be given content and meaning through application in case-specific situations. See D.F., 115 F.3d at 417 . This court cannot develop continuity and control over precedent in this area if we are not permitted to exercise a fully independent review of the facts and issues before us. Application of the standard of review fashioned by the majority would create varied and inconsistent results in death penalty cases. As the Supreme Court astutely recognized: “Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law. This, if a matter-of-course, would be unacceptable.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697 , 134 L. Ed. 2d at 919 , 116 S. Ct. at 1662 .
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court likewise recognized: “[o]ur capital punishment doctrine is rooted in the principle that ‘ “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be ... wantonly and ... freakishly imposed.” ’ ” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 , Ill L. Ed. 2d 606, 618, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3099 (1990), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883 , 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 390 , 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2763 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Our legislature has attempted to guard against “wanton” and “freakish” imposition of the death penalty in this state by giving this court the authority to review each penalty of death for fundamental unfairness. This task is best undertaken by applying a de novo standard of review in deciding the “ultimate question” before us.