requiring expert testimony demonstrating that prior injury is relevant to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence unless the trial court determines that the nature of the prior and current injuries are such that a lay person could readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries without expert assistance
How later courts described this case
- requiring expert testimony demonstrating that prior injury is relevant to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence unless the trial court determines that the nature of the prior and current injuries are such that a lay person could readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries without expert assistance
- finding that the defendant was required to elicit expert testimony to prove whether a past injury was causally related to the present injury suffered by plaintiff
- finding expert testimony is not required where a layperson could readily appraise the connection between medical treatment and injury
- in car accident case, court erred in admitting evidence of the plaintiff’s prior history of unspecified neck problems because there was no expert testimony establishing the nature of the prior neck problems or the relationship between those problems and the plaintiff’s current claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
In this lawsuit,'plaintiff alleges that he suffered neck and back pain which resulted from a car accident with defendant. At trial, defendant introduced evidence that plaintiff had received treatment for neck and back pain prior to his current accident. The jury awarded plaintiff no damages. The majority holds that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiffs prior neck and back pain without foundation testimony first being laid to link the earlier injuries to those plaintiff allegedly suffered in the current accident.
By today’s decision, the majority rejects the long-established rule that, without presenting expert medical foundation evidence, a defendant may introduce evidence of plaintiffs prior injury so long as that injury is to the same part of plaintiffs body. See Bailey v. Wilson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 297, 304 (1998); Elliott v. Koch, 200 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15-16 (1990); Elberts v. Nussbaum Trucking, Inc., 97 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384 (1981); Palsir v. McCorkle, 70 Ill. App. 2d 425, 431 (1966). This is an evidentiary rule of reason and convenience. The plaintiff, of course, is free to present evidence to rebut any linkage to the earlier injuries.
The majority bases its decision on its fear that allowing evidence of a plaintiffs prior injuries without expert foundation testimony “invite [s] the jury to speculate on the nexus between the prior and current injuries.” 192 Ill. 2d at 54. The majority worries that retaining the same part of the body rule would permit defendants to introduce evidence of a plaintiffs prior injury ‘‘ ‘without any further showing of relevance or causation, even if the prior injury had completely healed and been symptom free for decades.’ ” 192 Ill. 2d at 54, quoting Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404-05 (1996). These concerns are unfounded.
If a prior injury has “completely healed” and the plaintiff has “been symptom free for decades,” the plaintiff has the opportunity of rebutting defendant’s evidence with competent medical testimony, most likely plaintiffs own treating physician. Unlike the majority, I am confident that jurors are quite capable of understanding a plaintiffs argument that his prior injury has “long since healed” (see 192 111. 2d at 54) and is therefore distinguishable from the injury for which he presently seeks money damages. If, as the majority also worries, there Eire medical complexities regEirding the relationship between the prior and current injuries, these questions are resolvable through the evidentiary and trial processes which are available to the plaintiff and his doctor. What is at issue here is an evidentiary question of weight, not admissibility. On that issue, the majority opinion misses the point. The trial court’s admission of defendant’s evidence comports with both common sense and the longstanding rule to that effect.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.