noting that “unlike an ordinary citizen, the policeman has no option as to whether to respond” (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- noting that “unlike an ordinary citizen, the policeman has no option as to whether to respond” (emphasis in original)
- noting that, like the officer in Johnson, the officer in White was acting in a capacity that required him to have his " 'attention and energies directed towards being prepared to deal with any eventuality' "
- finding “no comparable civilian occupation to that of a traffic patrolman responding to the call of a citizen”
- noting that an officer responding to a citizen “must have his attention and energies directed towards being prepared to deal with any eventuality”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MORAN, also dissenting:
Although pension statutes are to be given liberal construction to effect their purpose and the objectives to be accomplished (Edwards v. Board of Trustees (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263 , affd (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 330 ), I disagree with the majority’s expansive interpretation of the term “act of duty” and would reverse.
There are two distinct disability provisions in the Pension Code. A policeman who becomes disabled is entitled to “ordinary” disability benefits equal to 50% of his salary at the time the disability occurs. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 5 — 155.) If, however, the policeman becomes disabled as a result of an injury suffered “in the performance of an act or acts of duty,” he is entitled to receive “duty disability” benefits equal to 75% of his salary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. IO8V2, par. 5 — 144.) The distinction turns on the statutory definition of “act of duty.”
Section 5 — 113 of the Code defines the term “act of duty” to include “[a]ny act of police duty inherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. IO8V2, par. 5 — 113.) The plain meaning of the statute limits this definition to include only those activities involving extraordinary risks peculiar to the performance of police duties. The definition contemplates an act in response to a situation in which the officer faces peculiar hazards by reason of his police duties. Eligibility for “duty disability” benefits is restricted to police officers whose conduct rises above and beyond the call of duty and who become disabled as the result of undertaking extraordinary risks or acts of heroism in the performance of their duties.
The plaintiff’s injury was not the result of such an undertaking or risk. The act of crossing a street is not an extraordinary undertaking or risk. It is not, in the language of section 5 — 113, an act which is “not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life.” Allowing the plaintiff in this case to receive duty-disability benefits is not only contrary to the General Assembly’s intent as expressly manifested in the Pension Code, it is an affront to those police officers who have or will suffer disabling injuries in the performance of extraordinary acts of courage in discharging their duty to serve and protect the citizens of their community.
JUSTICE RYAN joins in this dissent.