finding that the EJJP statute was not vague, the appellate court held that a juvenile violates the “conditions of his or her sentence” by a “failure to comply with the juvenile sentence”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the EJJP statute was not vague, the appellate court held that a juvenile violates the “conditions of his or her sentence” by a “failure to comply with the juvenile sentence”
- holding the term “offense,” as used in section 5–810, is not unconstitutionally vague
- “we find the legislature must have meant ‘offense’ as a criminal offense as such is defined in the Criminal Code”
- 348 Ill.App.3d at 142-43, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority opinion correctly concludes that defendant’s murder conviction must be affirmed, but the holding that an EJJ transfer was unavailable in this case is contrary to our case law and the plain language of the EJJ statute. The EJJ statute allows the State to file an EJJ petition “at any time prior to commencement of the minor’s trial.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — 810(1) (West 1998). The majority opinion’s contrary conclusion that the petition may not be filed at any time prior to trial rests on the “law of the case” doctrine, which states that, “ ‘a rule established as controlling in a particular case will continue to be the law of the case, as long as the facts remain the same.’ ” 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140, quoting People v. Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877, 884 (2000), citing People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 468 (1992). The majority holds that the doctrine applies in this case, but the EJJ statute provides that, “[u]pon successful completion of the juvenile sentence the court shall vacate the adult criminal sentence.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 — 810(7) (West 1998). The defendant may serve an adult sentence if new facts arise in the future resulting in an unsuccessful completion of the sentence, though the court is not required to order execution of the adult sentence unless the minor later commits a new offense. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 810(6) (West 1998). Thus, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.
A rule that the State must move for EJJ designation and transfer simultaneously would promote judicial economy, but finds no support in the law. The majority states in obiter dicta that “ [i]t would be unconstitutional as applied to C.K. to allow the State, after having the higher burden of having the eight [discretionary adult] transfer factors considered and rejected, to make a second attempt under a lesser burden.” 348 Ill. App. 3d at 141. However, the majority cites no provision of the United States or Illinois Constitutions, or case law so holding. Thus, in this case, this court should not abandon the presumption of constitutionality afforded Illinois statutes.