“In determining whether multiple crimes have been committed as part of a common design, scheme, or plan, we find it far more sensible to focus on the defendant’s state of mind or purpose in committing the offenses than on the factual similarities of the offenses. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the fact that similarities between crimes is the focus for determining the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to establish the existence of modus operandi. In fact, we suspect that confusion between the concepts of common design, scheme, or plan, and modus operandi . . . has led to the line of cases on which the [s]tate relies.” [Citation omitted.]
How later courts described this case
- “In determining whether multiple crimes have been committed as part of a common design, scheme, or plan, we find it far more sensible to focus on the defendant’s state of mind or purpose in committing the offenses than on the factual similarities of the offenses. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the fact that similarities between crimes is the focus for determining the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to establish the existence of modus operandi. In fact, we suspect that confusion between the concepts of common design, scheme, or plan, and modus operandi . . . has led to the line of cases on which the [s]tate relies.” [Citation omitted.]
- “In the absence of any one particular distinctive feature *** Illinois courts have found that a sufficient number of common features can form a distinctive combination sufficient to establish the existence of a modus operandi.”
- "[t]he term modus operandi refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes committed in that pattern are recognizable as having been committed by the same person"
- evidence of subsequent crimes that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s inadmissible to show the defendant’s motive in 1955 murder
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HALL, dissenting:
I believe that the “other-crimes” evidence in this case was admissible as evidence of defendant’s modus operandi. Moreover, the strong evidence in this case including defendant’s admissions to four witnesses that he killed the boys renders harmless any error that may have occurred in admitting this other-crimes evidence. Therefore, I dissent.
Modus operandi refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinct that separate crimes or wrongful conduct are recognized as the work of the same person. People v. Bullock, 154 Ill. App. 3d 266 , 507 N.E.2d 44 (1987). Evidence of other offenses is relevant and admissible as proof of modus operandi only upon a strong and persuasive showing of similarity of the crime charged and the other offenses. People v. Partin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 365 , 509 N.E.2d 662 (1987). The crimes must share peculiar and distinctive common features so as to earmark both crimes as the handiwork of the defendant. Bullock, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 269 .
The majority finds that we lack the amount of detail of the other crimes necessary to establish the existence of a modus operandi. However, the evidence establishes that in each instance the victims were young boys ages 11 to 16. The victims were all picked up while they were hitchhiking by either defendant or someone working with defendant. The victims were all brought to horse stables where defendant worked. Defendant would then engage in sexual activities with these boys. In the instant case the Peterson/Schuessler boys, ages 11 to 13, were picked up while hitchhiking, were taken to the Idle Hours stables, and were sexually assaulted. I believe that the sexual assaults committed against the Peterson/Schuessler boys in this case and the sexual assaults against other boys share peculiar and distinctive features so as to earmark the crimes as the handiwork of one man. Any possible error in the admission of the “other-crimes” evidence is harmless in light of the evidence submitted in this case. See People v. McCarthy, 132 Ill. 2d 331 (1989); People v. Mikolajewski, 272 Ill. App. 3d 311 (1995). Four witnesses testified that defendant admitted to them that he killed the Peterson/Schuessler boys. Spry testified that defendant told him that he (defendant) picked up three boys who were hitchhiking and took them back to the barn. Defendant admitted that he accidently strangled one of the boys while holding him by the neck and then had no choice but to kill the other two. Defendant admitted dumping the bodies in the forest preserve. Defendant told Spry that one of the boys was named Peterson. Hollatz testified that about one week after the bodies were found, defendant admitted that he had picked up the three boys who were hitchhiking and had killed them. Wemette testified that defendant twice admitted strangling the boys after picking them up hitchhiking and taking them back to the barn at the Idle Hours stables. Defendant also told Wemette that his (defendant’s) brother was there and hit one of the boys with a blunt object. Plemmons testified that defendant told him that it was either the boys or him because in 1955 it was unacceptable to be gay. When Plemmons asked defendant if he had killed the three boys, defendant responded affirmatively.
Moreover, the independent evidence corroborated defendant’s oral admissions. Defendant’s admissions that he picked the boys up hitchhiking were corroborated by the testimony that the boys were last seen hitchhiking on the corner of Milwaukee and Lawrence. His admission that he took the boys to the Idle Hours Stable was corroborated by Salerno’s testimony that she heard two screams coming from the direction of the stables on the night the boys disappeared. Defendant’s admission that he accidently strangled one of the boys while holding him by the neck and that his brother hit one of the boys with a blunt object was corroborated by the medical testimony that John Schuessler was strangled to death in a manner consistent with being placed in a choke hold while simultaneously being struck in the head. His admissions that he strangled the boys were corroborated by Dr. Donoghue’s testimony that the cause of death for each boy was strangulation. Finally, defendant’s admissions that the older boy was named Peterson and that he dumped the bodies in the forest preserve were corroborated by the independent evidence regarding where the bodies were found and the identification of the bodies.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.