Opinion

Whelihan v. Markowski

  • 37 Mass. App. Ct. 209
  • 638 N.E.2d 927
  • 1994 Mass. App. LEXIS 797
Court
Massachusetts Appeals Court
Filed
Aug 25, 1994
Status
Published
Author
Brown
On the bench
Brown, Perretta, Jacobs
Cited by
15 cases

concluding that the prerequisite to suit under e. 93A, § 9, was met when the plaintiffs sent her demand to the defendants’ active counsel of record

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that the prerequisite to suit under e. 93A, § 9, was met when the plaintiffs sent her demand to the defendants’ active counsel of record
  • interpreting section nine and noting, “Whether an offer is reasonable is normally a question of fact ... which must be determined in light of ... all the attendant facts and circumstances”
  • lacerations, scarring, and five percent permanent disability in right arm as a result of shattering glass
  • property manager knowingly placed plate glass rather than safety glass in tenant’s rear door

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Brown, J.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I am in agreement, for the most part, with the majority’s opinion, I part company on the multiple damages issue. I do not think that on these facts the damages should be enhanced, let alone trebled. Granted, the owner’s building manager here had some maintenance experience and was more than a mere on-site representative, but, in my view, it is too great a stretch in these circumstances to elevate him to the *216 status of “a professional building manager” and one deemed to be fully cognizable with all State Building Code “requirements bearing an immediate relationship to the safety of those using the building,” thereby providing a basis for a wilful and knowing violation of c. 93A, rather than merely careless conduct. The majority posits liability on the theory of the evidence that the property manager “intentionally” put inappropriate windowpane glass in what he knew to be a “hazardous location,” the danger (i.e., “risk of physical harm”) of which he ignored by “choosing to remain uninformed about building code requirements.” All this is rather much and transforms routine negligence, for which the plaintiff is fully compensated, into a wilful act. I would have thought a wilful act meant something akin to knowing disregard. Let us not forget the observation of Holmes that “a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.” Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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