finding that a defendant’s allegations that he -8- suffered from mental impairments did not necessarily establish that he was unfit and the issue, instead, was whether the defendant “could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a defendant’s allegations that he -8- suffered from mental impairments did not necessarily establish that he was unfit and the issue, instead, was whether the defendant “could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel”
- rejecting claim of actual innocence where codefendants averred that stating the defendant had shot the victim had been a “scheme,” where the defendant confessed, was identified by an eyewitness, and statements by the defendant and codefendants “describe[d] in strikingly similar detail the circumstances of the crime”
- stating the mere fact that a defendant suffers from mental impairments does not necessarily establish that the defendant was unfit to stand trial or plead guilty
- “Regarding the second Strickland prong, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” [Citation.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s judgment to allow, at minimum, an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I further agree, in part, with Justice McMorrow’s conclusion that the death penalty is inappropriate in this case for the reasons stated in her dissent on direct appeal. See People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 165-71 (1998) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I maintain that defendant’s convictions and sentence should be set aside because the trial court proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. The procedures in capital cases prior to this court’s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. Consequently, since the new rules were promulgated to address the deficiencies of constitutional dimension that regularly occurred under the old system, those rules must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending on appeal before this court. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997).