finding that a defendant’s allegations that he -8- suffered from mental impairments did not necessarily establish that he was unfit and the issue, instead, was whether the defendant “could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a defendant’s allegations that he -8- suffered from mental impairments did not necessarily establish that he was unfit and the issue, instead, was whether the defendant “could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel”
- rejecting claim of actual innocence where codefendants averred that stating the defendant had shot the victim had been a “scheme,” where the defendant confessed, was identified by an eyewitness, and statements by the defendant and codefendants “describe[d] in strikingly similar detail the circumstances of the crime”
- stating the mere fact that a defendant suffers from mental impairments does not necessarily establish that the defendant was unfit to stand trial or plead guilty
- “Regarding the second Strickland prong, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” [Citation.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that the circuit court erred when it dismissed, without an evidentiary hearing, Harris’ claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence in mitigation. I write separately because I would go beyond the majority’s disposition and hold that Harris is entitled to immediate post-conviction relief. Regardless of the outcome of any further proceedings on remand, Harris’ convictions and sentences cannot stand. That is so because he was tried, convicted and sentenced under a system of capital punishment that is fatally defective.
Our court has now adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us on review. Whether the new rules will be sufficient to place this State’s capital punishment system within the tolerances permitted by the State and federal constitutions is a question we cannot yet answer. It is clear, however, that no proceeding conducted without the benefit of those rules can be deemed reliable. As a result, remanding for further proceedings on Harris’ petition is unnecessary. Rather, we should grant Harris relief on the merits, set aside his convictions and sentence of death, and order that he be granted a new trial without further delay.