holding that “Pennsylvania has long subscribed to the at-will employment doctrine. Exceptions to that doctrine have generally been limited to instances where a statute or contract limits the power of an employer unilaterally to terminate the employment relationship.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “Pennsylvania has long subscribed to the at-will employment doctrine. Exceptions to that doctrine have generally been limited to instances where a statute or contract limits the power of an employer unilaterally to terminate the employment relationship.”
- “When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguityf,] the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very words.”
- using “agreement” instead of “contract”
- “Section 5-514 offer[s] a measure of job protection to school ‘officers, employees, [and] appointees,’ setting forth the grounds for removal and the right to notice and a hearing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
Dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that § 10 — 1089(c) of the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 1-101 et seq., gives appellant “job removal protections” that preclude his dismissal.
“[A]s a general rule, Pennsylvania law holds that ‘employees are at-will, absent a contract, and may be terminated at any time, for any reason or for no reason.’ ” Pipkin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 Pa. 1 , 693 A.2d 190, 191 (1997) (quoting Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Municipal Authority, 540 Pa. 391 , 658 A.2d 333, 335 (1995)). “A governmental employee only has a personal or property right in his employment where he can establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either a contract or a statute.” Id., at 192 (citation omitted). Clearly there was no written contract involved at the time of dismissal. The question here is whether this Code gives appellant a legitimate expectation of continued employment.
I am in agreement with the majority of the Commonwealth Court, which stated:
Construing the statute to give effect to all of its provisions, we find that the statute grants school boards the option of entering into employment agreements with business administrators and thus creating a property right. It does not create a property right for business administrators who do not have an employment agreement....
* * *
The permissive nature of Section 1089, the failure to include the situation where a business administrator is not under an employment agreement, and the lack of a comprehensive *195 employment and tenure scheme combined with the plain words of the statute lead this Court to conclude that the legislature did not intend to establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment absent an employment agreement.
Board of School Directors of Susquenita School District v. Knox, Nos. 70 and 83 CD 2002, unpublished memorandum at 6-7, 809 A.2d 1096 (Pa.Cmwlth. filed Oct. 7, 2002).
Indeed, the Code section at issue speaks to the ability of a Board to employ, set duties, enter and renew written employment contracts, and to remove business administrators. It does not confer rights on the person the Board hires. It gives the Board the right to remove “at any time” rather than at the end of a specific term of employment, but if such “any time” removal is sought, the procedure and reasons are limited to those set forth. This does not say that only these most fundamental reasons — incompetence, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of the law — will permit removal. It does not give the non-contract employee “job removal protections” or any “right” to continue employment no matter the desire of the Board to make a change.
This section, dealing with the authority of the Board, does not give appellant any rights or expectations, nor in my judgment does it change his status as an at-will employee. Hence, my respectful dissent from the result reached by my colleagues.