Brown, *926 J., concurring
How later courts described this case
- Brown, *926 J., concurring
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brown J.
(concurring). I concur fully with the reasoning and result of this court’s decision. I enthusiastically endorse its stem admonition of the deplorable advocacy on the part of George’s attorney. 1 There must be limits on what a lawyer will do for a client. Lawyers are not hired guns. Our profession is a higher calling, and we should be about loftier business. To paraphrase an all to often repeated refrain: members of the bar are ill-advised to consider that any departure from the norm *565 which is not so grievous as to call for judicial or bar oversight “sets a new and less elevated standard for lawyers’ behavior.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Mass. 185, 197-198 (1977).
The duty to represent a client zealously (see S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 7-101[A], as appearing in 382 Mass. 784 [1981]) is not unqualified. See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 7-101(B) and DR 7-102(A), as appearing in 382 Mass. 784 ,785 (1981). Lawyers have an obligation to the public and the profession to decline engagement for obviously dilatory tactics. At least some of George’s positions on this most recent round of litigation have this character. There have been thirteen years of maneuver by George to avoid his obligations. It is a reproach to the system of justice.
The vituperative tone of George’s briefs is made the more objectionable because it is employed in aid of some transparent attempts to make the worse appear the better reason.