The opinion
Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. In Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Cheek, 328 Ark. 18 , 942 S.W.2d 821 (1997), we suggested that the General Assembly revisit the confusing language used in Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (1987). Specifically, we questioned what that legislative body intended when it provided for an appeal to the circuit court firom a “final action” taken by an administrative and quasi-judicial agency like the Springdale City Council. See also Green v. City of Jacksonville, 357 Ark. 517 , 182 S.W.3d 124 (2004); Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark 129 , 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003); and Pierce Add’n Homeowners v. City of Vilonia, 76 Ark. App. 393 , 65 S.W.3d 485 (2002).
As pointed out by the majority, § 14-56-425 incorporates Arkansas Inferior Court Rule 9, which must be followed in all civil cases appealed from a district court to circuit court. However, in such a situation, a question arises regarding whether the General Assembly intended to require the party appealing to file within thirty days from the date of the “entry of judgment,” even though a City Board does not actually issue a “judgment.” Under Ark. R. Civ. P. 58, a judgment “shall be set forth on a separate document and is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Administrative Order No. 2.” Thus, the thirty-day time limit for filing an appeal from that decision commences only when the lower court’s judgment is entered. 1
If we are going to continue to apply the same procedural rules used in appealing district court decisions to circuit court, we should consider the action taken by the Springdale Board to be ineffective until the Board finalizes its decision by entering its approval of the minutes reflecting the Board’s prior vote. Until such action is taken, I am unaware of any rule or law that would bar the Board or any of its members from requesting another vote on the action previously taken. Moreover, there is nothing that would prevent members from asking that the Board’s action be modified in some way until that action has been entered, filed, and finalized. In other words, I would reverse the trial court’s decision and interpret “final action” in § 14-56-425 to mean a decision that is effective or triggered by the filing or entry of the judgment, decision, or action taken, whether it is a City Board action or District Court order.
In my view, it is senseless to review each record in every council vote or action in order to determine if there could be additional matters or actions to deal with in the future. It is simpler and more accurate to compute the thirty-day period as beginning when the council or board approves and “enters” or “files” its minutes, effectively putting the subject to rest.
The majority opinion refers to a New Mexico case, Serna v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 88 N.M. 282 , 540 P.2d 212 (1975); however, that case involves that state’s own unique rules, procedures, and case law. For example, the New Mexico rule pertaining to appeals from a zoning authority reads, “The petition [for writ of certiorari] shall be presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the decision is entered in the records of the clerk of the zoning authority.” See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-20-7 (1963). The Serna court interpreted these words to mean that the 30-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari commenced to run when the zoning board makes its decision, not when the decision is filed. In contrast, our District Court Rule 9 provides for appeals, not petitions for writs of certiorari; most importantly however, our Rule 58 and Administrative Order No. 2 provide that the filing dates control all appeal-related deadlines.