The opinion
JUSTICE BRESLIN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the entirety of the majority’s opinion, save its conclusion that the County may be held jointly or vicariously liable for the unfair labor practice committed by the sheriff.
The majority hinges its determination on the fact that the Labor Relation Act provides that county boards are designated joint employers of county peace officers. I find it difficult to fathom how this fact compels the majority to impute the unfair labor practices committed by the sheriff to the county.
The majority cites Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519 , 640 N.E.2d 926 (1994), stating that its holding is inapplicable to this case because the county’s liability is not being derived under the doctrine of respondent superior liability.
In Moy, the plaintiff brought a negligence suit against the county on behalf of his decedent, who died while confined as an inmate in the county jail. The county moved to dismiss the complaint based upon the fact that it was not a proper party defendant. The trial court granted the motion and the appellate court and the supreme court affirmed.
The supreme court concluded that the sheriff was a county officer and not a county employee. Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 532 , 640 N.E.2d at 931 . In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the sheriff was an independently elected official and the county was given no authority to control his office. Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 526-29 , 640 N.E.2d at 929-30 . Because the sheriff was an officer and not an employee of the county, the county could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior liability. Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 529-30 , 640 N.E.2d at 930 . To impute negligence of one person to another requires the existence of either a master and servant, principal and agent, or employer and employee relationship. Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 524 , 640 N.E.2d at 928 ; see also Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256 , 43 N.E.2d 973 (1942).
There have been no independent acts attributed to the county that could be construed as unfair labor practices in this case. So on what then does the majority base its finding of joint liability?
The sheriff, like the sheriff in Moy, acted independently, without any directives or orders from the county. In fact, the duty owed to Huff by the sheriff was imposed by the Labor Relations Act and had nothing to do with the county, which has no authority to direct the actions of the sheriff with regard to employment decisions.
Thus, regardless of the county’s joint employer status concerning Huff, there is no relationship, either employer and employee or otherwise, between the sheriff and the county by which vicarious liability can be imposed. See Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 524 , 640 N.E.2d at 928 . Because there is no basis upon which to hold the county liable for the unfair labor practices in this case, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds otherwise.