holding that, because the defendant did not file a pro se petition, his attorneys could not have violated the provision of Rule 651(c), which requires “counsel to affirm that he ‘has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984))
How later courts described this case
- holding that, because the defendant did not file a pro se petition, his attorneys could not have violated the provision of Rule 651(c), which requires “counsel to affirm that he ‘has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984))
- holding a trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 when a defendant is taking psychotropic drugs at trial or sentencing does not constitute a violation of due process, and, therefore, is not a cognizable claim in post-conviction proceedings
- holding that a defendant’s ingestion of psychotropic medication, without more, does not give rise to a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness requiring the trial court to order a fitness hearing
- holding a trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to deny defendant’s petition for rehearing. Once again, I must emphasize my strong and sustained disagreement with the decision of the court in this case. As noted in my original dissent, no legitimate reason exists in this case which would warrant a departure from stare decisis.
In his petition for rehearing, defendant correctly observes that neither he nor the State asked this court to revisit Brandon and its progeny. Defendant further points out that during oral argument, held on May 10, 1999, not one member of the court raised any question about the validity of the controlling precedent. Not surprisingly, defendant claims that the court’s sua sponte treatment of this issue was “fundamentally unfair.” He notes that most courts generally abstain from deciding issues on which the parties have had no opportunity to present argument. Defendant asks that he and the State be allowed to file supplemental briefs addressing the matters raised and disposed of by the court sua sponte.
I believe that defendant’s requests are well taken. At the very least, defendant’s attorneys should be given the opportunity to reargue defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel/psychotropic drug claim in light of the new legal standards announced by a majority of the court, new standards that his attorneys could not possibly have foreseen. I note that when the United States Supreme Court overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 , 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), the Court specifically ordered the parties to file additional briefing materials addressing the validity of the prior precedent. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 , 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). Moreover, as defendant correctly observes in his petition for rehearing, this court has, since Mitchell was announced, allowed supplemental briefing in two cases that are currently pending-People v. Johnson, No. 84146 (order entered February 29, 2000), and People v. Jamison, No. 80967 (order entered March 21, 2000). Because this defendant’s attorneys were not on notice that the validity of Brandon and its progeny was in question, I would grant them the same opportunity to represent their claims. The court’s unwillingness to do even this is hard to understand.
In sum, I would grant rehearing in this case because I believe the court’s decision to overrule Brandon and its progeny was ill-advised. In light of my colleagues’ refusal to do that, I would grant defendant’s alternative request that he be allowed to reargue his claims in light of the new law established in this case.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.