holding that, because the defendant did not file a pro se petition, his attorneys could not have violated the provision of Rule 651(c), which requires “counsel to affirm that he ‘has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984))
How later courts described this case
- holding that, because the defendant did not file a pro se petition, his attorneys could not have violated the provision of Rule 651(c), which requires “counsel to affirm that he ‘has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984))
- holding a trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 when a defendant is taking psychotropic drugs at trial or sentencing does not constitute a violation of due process, and, therefore, is not a cognizable claim in post-conviction proceedings
- holding that a defendant’s ingestion of psychotropic medication, without more, does not give rise to a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness requiring the trial court to order a fitness hearing
- holding a trial court’s failure to conduct a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
I join the majority opinion. I write separately to respond to several points raised by the dissenting opinion in this case.
Notably, the dissent musters only a brief defense of People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994), and its progeny, and their interpretation of section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104 — 21(a)). The dissent offers no new analysis of the question and simply perpetuates the erroneous premise of the Brandon line of cases by equating the statutory right found in section 104 — 21(a) with the distinct constitutional right not to be tried while unfit, as embodied in the due process clause. Too, the dissent takes issue with what it insists are inconsistencies in the views of the justices who disagreed with the Brandon rule and who questioned the court’s efforts to transmute a statutory right into a constitutional one. What the dissent’s lengthy discussion fails to mention, but is evident from even a cursory reading of the earlier cases, is that the majority opinions themselves evolved and changed focus, as the court considered different aspects of the problems posed by its application of the Brandon rule in different procedural contexts. The dissents to those decisions appropriately addressed the specific factual settings in which the issue then happened to arise.
In support of the Brandon rule, the dissent relies primarily on the doctrine of stare decisis as grounds for leaving that line of authority undisturbed. Our departure from stare decisis finds ample justification here, however. The earlier cases attest to the continuing problems the Brandon rule produced as the court labored to provide the statutory right with a constitutional foundation. Considerations of stare decisis should weigh little in these circumstances, where a misguided interpretation of a procedural statute threatened to become a permanent and curious feature of our constitutional law. Relevant here are the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 , 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), when it overruled part of its four-year-old decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 , 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 , 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), which had barred the use of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings. The Court noted the importance normally played by stare decisis in our system of justice but also recognized that the doctrine does not mean that a precedent must remain forever frozen in the law:
“Adhering to precedent ‘is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.’ [Citation.] Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’ [Citation.] Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’ [Citation.] This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’ [Citation.] Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved [citations]; the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28 , 115 L. Ed. 2d at 737 , 111 S. Ct. at 2609-10 .
As Payne instructs, the doctrine of stare decisis is not intended to permanently enshrine an incorrect rule of law, isolating it forever from review and reconsideration. “Stare decisis is an important factor in the judicial process, but we must not forget that it is not the whole process.” Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 615 (1956). The rule first announced by the court in Brandon and later applied in a variety of circumstances mistakenly confused a statutory right with a constitutional right. It is not too late to correct that erroneous interpretation. The surprising thing in all of this is not that the court now decides to overrule Brandon and its progeny, but that those cases managed to survive as long as they did.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and HEIPLE join in this special concurrence.