finding that new evidence of police torture was material and would likely change the result upon retrial where defendant consistently claimed he was tortured, his claims of torture were “strikingly similar to other claims” depicted in the new evidence, and the officers identified in the evidence were also involved in - 12 - defendant’s case
How later courts described this case
- finding that new evidence of police torture was material and would likely change the result upon retrial where defendant consistently claimed he was tortured, his claims of torture were “strikingly similar to other claims” depicted in the new evidence, and the officers identified in the evidence were also involved in - 12 - defendant’s case
- holding that postconviction challenge to voluntariness of confession was “barred by res judicata” where, on direct appeal, reviewing court “addressed the voluntariness of defendant’s confession and held that the trial court did not err in finding defendant’s confession voluntary”
- finding allegations of other incidents were not relevant to the defendant’s claim where the prior victim said that the lieutenant threatened him but did not allege that he was physically coerced
- noting that a report of the Chicago Police Department’s office of professional standards concluded that torture like that alleged by the defendant in that case was “systemic and methodical at Area 2 under the command of [Lieutenant Jon] Burge”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence at trial that defendant’s confession was coerced, and on his claim that new evidence demonstrates that his confession was the product of torture at the hands of police. I write separately however because I believe defendant is also entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing, during the hearing on the motion to suppress defendant’s confession, to make arguments which would have resulted in the admission of additional evidence in support of defendant’s claims of torture by police.
FACTS
On April 19, 1986, Vincent Sanchez and Rafaela Sanchez were found stabbed to death in their home in Chicago. The bodies were discovered after Wayne Washington, a 13-year-old youth who routinely performed odd jobs for the couple, alerted neighbors that the rear door of the Sanchez home was open and that the kitchen floor was bloody. Neighbors subsequently called police. After the police officers discovered the bodies, they questioned Washington. He told police that he had seen Eric Caine and “DeEdward” “across from” the Sanchez residence. Police later located DeEdward and brought him to the police station for Washington to identify.
Shortly thereafter, DeEdward’s 16-year-old cousin, Marva Hall, came forward claiming to have information about the murders. At the time she spoke to police, Hall believed that DeEdward had been arrested for the murders and was still in jail. In her statement, Hall claimed that defendant had told her that he, and not Hall’s cousin who had also been questioned in connection with the murders, had killed the Sanchezes.
Several days later, defendant was arrested by police on an unrelated matter and was taken to the fourth district police station in Chicago. Shortly thereafter, Detective James Pienta, who was investigating the Sanchez murders, learned that defendant had been taken into custody. Pienta then went to the fourth district police station and transported defendant to Area 2 Violent Crimes headquarters, where defendant was questioned by two officers.
According to police, defendant initially denied knowledge of the Sanchez murders. Subsequently however, defendant told police officers that he, along with another man, had killed the Sanchez es during the course of a robbery. The police reduced defendant’s confession to writing, although defendant refused to sign it.
Defendant acknowledges that he told police that he had committed the Sanchez murders. However, defendant contends that he did so only after he was tortured by police officers during his interrogation. Before his trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession on the ground that it was involuntary. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified that he was tortured for an extended period of time by a red-haired officer (later identified as Jon Burge), by Detective Pienta, and by others. According to defendant, the torture included repeated beatings, threats at gunpoint, and suffocation using a gray plastic typewriter cover. In support of his claims, defendant attempted to introduce photographs which allegedly depicted an interior view of the interview room where defendant was questioned. According to a defense offer of proof, the photographs would have shown certain messages which defendant had etched, using a paper clip, into a bench in the interview room when he was left alone after giving his confession. These photographs, which were subsequently introduced at sentencing, showed the following writings on the bench of the interview room:
“I lied about murders police threatened me with violence slapped and suffocated me with plastic — no phone — no dad signed false statement to murders (Tonto) Aaron.”
“Sign false statements to murder, Tonto on statements is code word Aaron.”
The phrase “Aaron lied” also appears etched on the door to the room.
Defendant argued that these etched statements, made close in time to his confession, strongly supported his claims that his confession had been coerced by means of police torture. The trial court refused to consider defendant’s written statements, however, ruling that they were inadmissible hearsay. This court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s direct appeal. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 451-54. In reaching our holding, this court considered and rejected defendant’s arguments that the etchings were admissible either under the spontaneous declaration or prior consistent statement exceptions to the hearsay rule. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 452-53. This court likewise rejected defendant’s arguments that the statements were admissible under the curative admissibility and completeness doctrines. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 453-S4. 4
DISCUSSION
In his post-conviction petition, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for the admission of the etchings on the grounds that hearsay is admissible at motions to suppress and other pretrial hearings. Defendant argues that this position was amply supported by existing law at the time of the suppression hearing, citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75 , 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250-52 , 94 S. Ct. 988, 993-95 (1974); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 , 93 L. Ed. 1879 , 69 S. Ct. 1602 (1949); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), 1101(d)(1); People v. Jones, 75 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337-38 (1966); People v. Fugate, 77 111. App. 3d 103, 105 (1979); and People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App. 3d 679, 680, 683 (1995). Defendant also contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue that the etchings were admissible to rebut the State’s evidence that defendant did not complain of injury or protest his treatment to the paramedic, the assistant State’s Attorneys, or the detectives. Defendant maintains that, had his counsel made these arguments, the results of the suppression hearing would have been different.
In today’s opinion, the majority correctly holds that the etchings would have been admissible, even if they were hearsay, in the context of a motion to suppress. The majority refuses to grant defendant an evidentiary hearing on his claim, however, on the ground that defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been admitted, the results of the suppression hearing would have been different. The majority states that the trial court refused to admit the etchings not only because the judge believed them to be hearsay, but also because the judge found that defendant could not establish that the photographs accurately depicted the etchings as they were when the defendant made them, and because the etchings were not relevant to the motion to suppress. The majority holds that these findings indicate that the judge would have given no weight to the etchings even if the photographs had been admitted and, therefore, the result of the suppression hearing would have been the same.
The majority is incorrect. First, the majority misreads the record when it states that the trial judge found that the etchings were not relevant to the motion to suppress. A careful reading of the hearing transcript indicates that it was the testimony of the photographer, not the photographs of the etchings themselves, which the judge found to be irrelevant. That finding, however, was premised upon the judge’s belief that the photographs of the etchings were inadmissible as hearsay. In that light, the judge’s ruling makes perfect sense. If the photographs are indeed inadmissible hearsay, then the testimony by the photographer concerning how, when, and where the photographs were taken would indeed be irrelevant. However, because this court has now recognized that the photographs of the etchings were admissible even if hearsay, the judge’s findings concerning the relevance of the photographer’s testimony is shown to be error. Moreover, even if the majority’s reading of the record were correct and the judge had found that photographs of the etchings were themselves irrelevant to defendant’s contention that he was tortured by police, such a finding would be clearly erroneous.
The majority further states that “the trial court *** specifically found that it did not believe that defendant had established that the etchings in the pictures were in the same condition as the etchings were when defendant allegedly made them.” 192 111. 2d at 112-13. Indeed, after reiterating its erroneous position that the photographs were inadmissible as hearsay, the court made the following comments:
“I believe another important aspect that is very disturbing is the point of time where the etchings originated when in fact the investigator went and viewed these etchings. Certainly it would be rather difficult, if not impossible, but it would be difficult for the defense to show that these etchings are exactly as they were on the date indicated herein. There is a point of time, there is a certain possibility of any possible changes that could have been made, which we would have no knowledge of but which would have transpired on this theory ***.”
According to the majority, these statements demonstrate that the trial court would have given no weight to the photographs even if they had been admitted.
The majority reads too much into the trial court’s comments. Although the trial court raised the possibility the etchings had been tampered with and expressed skepticism concerning the ability of the defense to establish that the etchings had not been altered from their original form before they were photographed, the court stopped well short of finding that the etchings had been tampered with or that the photographs were inaccurate. In any event, the trial court’s initial erroneous rulings that the photographs were inadmissible hearsay and that the testimony of the photographer was irrelevant deprived the defense of any meaningful opportunity to establish the accuracy and authenticity of the photographs. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, I do not believe that this court can confidently state that the trial court would have given no weight to photographs which appear to show messages written by defendant immediately after he was allegedly tortured by police. On the contrary, these etchings, if authentic, would be highly probative of the veracity of defendant’s claims of torture. Accordingly, I would hold that the allegations of defendant’s petition, taken as true, establish a reasonable probability that defendant’s confession would have been suppressed if defense counsel had made the proper legal arguments for the admission of the photographs. Defendant is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s holding granting defendant evidentiary hearings on the two claims identified in the majority’s opinion. I dissent, however, from the majority’s refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s additional claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing on his motion to suppress his confession.
At this stage, defendant makes no argument concerning the correctness of this court’s ruling on direct appeal, and as such, that issue is not properly before the court at this time.