determining that certain facts in § 1983 suit were established in prior juvenile adjudication
How later courts described this case
- determining that certain facts in § 1983 suit were established in prior juvenile adjudication
- applying judicial estoppel to the sworn testimony of a juvenile in his juvenile criminal case, barring consideration of inconsistent testimony in a civil suit
- applying judicial estoppel to bar defendant from advancing different set of facts than those to which he had testified under oath in earlier criminal trial
- police officer’s reason for responding to situation by striking appellant on the head was “a key issue in the dispute” before the earlier tribunal (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring in the result:
Judge Ferren fairly states the facts of the case. I concur in Part II of his opinion that the false arrest claim is not precluded by the juvenile adjudication. Judge Pryor does also.
As to the assault claim, I agree that the issue is precluded from successive litigation. The significant question is whether appellant had a “full and fair” opportunity in the first trial to litigate to a final judgment the issue raised in the second suit. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333 , 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1445 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Jackson v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 412 A.2d 948, 953 (1980). Appellant received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of excessive force at the juvenile trial of which he took advantage. He testified he was passive and forced to kneel; that he was struck by the officer in the legs and head. However, notwithstanding his contention that he was passive while being assaulted by Officer Willis, the trial court found that appellant’s testimony was untrue. Appellant wishes to change his story of passivity in order to assert before a second court that, even if he did assault Officer Willis, as the officer had testified, the force employed by Willis was excessive. The decision of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-44 , 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), must extend to prevent such assertions here. Excessive force was recognized as an issue by the parties and the juvenile court judge in the credibility dispute over passivity. To allow this manipulation of testimony would contravene the purpose of the issue preclusion doctrine; it would permit individuals, who lose on one version of facts to change to a new and inconsistent version for the purpose of successive litigation.