holding that a common law fraud plaintiff must allege “(1) a false statement of material fact, (2) knowledge or belief of the falsity by the party making it, (3) intention to induce the other party to act, (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statements, and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a common law fraud plaintiff must allege “(1) a false statement of material fact, (2) knowledge or belief of the falsity by the party making it, (3) intention to induce the other party to act, (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statements, and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance”
- holding that a claim for unjust enrichment is “based upon an implied contract; where there is a specific contract that governs the relationship of the parties, the doctrine has no application”
- stating that, because the theory of unjust enrichment is based on a contract implied in law, it has no applicability where an actual contract exists
- noting that “[b]ecause unjust enrichment is based on an implied contract, where there is a specific contract which governs the relationship of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s decision to remand several counts to the trial court. I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the entire complaint.
First, the Attorney General does not have standing to bring this lawsuit. It is not within his common law or statutory powers to bring suit on behalf of a municipal corporation that could do so on its own. (People ex rel. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Barrett (1943), 382 Ill. 321, 332-45 .) The majority distinguishes Barrett on the ground that here the public corporation that the Attorney General seeks to represent did not object. This reading of Barrett is too narrow. The appropriate rule of law is that a public corporation that has the power to hire its own attorneys and bring its own suits must affirmatively ask the Attorney General to intervene. This did not occur here.
Next, the Consumer Fraud Act (the Act) does not apply to the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority (the Authority). This court’s opinion in Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 428, 467-69 , is controlling on this point. The Authority, like the school districts in A, C & S, is a body politic and not a person who may bring suit under the Act.
Additionally, there is no basis for a lawsuit since there are no money damages. The majority incorrectly concludes that the Attorney General has stated an injury for which we may grant relief.
Finally, the majority errs by not addressing the constitutionality argument. This issue is not beyond the scope of a section 2 — 615 motion. Further, the facts of this case are indistinguishable from the facts in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989), 489 U.S. 469 , 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 , 109 S. Ct. 706 , and therefore the Minority and Women Business Enterprise set-asides violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.