concluding that a truly independent federal agency should not be charged with knowledge of what another is doing simply because both are components of the same Federal Government
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a truly independent federal agency should not be charged with knowledge of what another is doing simply because both are components of the same Federal Government
- Defendant was under a duty to disclose if it knew that the Atomic Energy Commission was contemplating the construction of a huge construction project in the same general area which would necessitate the employment of a large labor force from higli-wage rate urban areas, and thereby increase the prevailing wages in the area. The case was remanded to the Trial Commissioner and, subsequently, it was held that defendant did not possess this information; Bateson-Stolte, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 386, 158 Ct.Cl. 455 (1962)
- the same case, No. 141-57, 158 Ct. Cl. 455, 305 F. 2d 386 (1962); Snyder-Lynch Motors Inc. v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 476, 479-80, 292 F. 2d 907, 909—10 (1961
- “[I]t seems unreasonable to charge one agency with knowledge of what another one is going to do. It would seem that defendant should be held liable only if the agency that dealt with plaintiff had knowledge of the impending employment of this huge labor force.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JONES, Chief Judge
(concurring in part).
While I cannot agree to the full reasoning of the majority, I agree that the case should be referred to a trial commissioner to the end that the facts may be presented.
It is unthinkable that the authorized officials of the defendant would enter into a binding contract with the plaintiff without disclosing vital information which was in full possession of defendant’s chosen officials and about which plaintiff alleges it knew nothing. This information was that a great project in that same area was already in process and nearing the final contract stage, which project would cost more than a billion dollars and would necessarily completely upset the labor market. This tremendous contract was to be let within a week.
If this were a case of first impression, I would be inclined to hold that the situation here was so extraordinary as to take it out of the general rule that a contractor must take chances on increased wages in the labor market. But in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 171 , 74 S.Ct. 438 , 98 L.Ed. 594 , and other cases cited in defendant’s brief, we are inclined to believe plaintiff may not recover on this phase of the case.
But to hold that in the light of the affirmative action of the defendant in freezing the wages which plaintiff was permitted to pay and still at the same time absorbing, on an entirely different project, practically all the available lab- or within a radius of 150 miles at a higher price than plaintiff was permitted to pay is beyond the range of reason. It is as if one of the entrants in a prize ring were permitted to tie the hands of his adversary and at the same time leave his own hands free, which manifestly would violate the fundamental tenet of fairness. If that is the law it is a phase of the law in which no thoughtful citizen can take pride. When the light of reason and the logic of analysis is brought into play any seeming justification for such a holding fades away.
It has been held for generations that a party to a contract may not interfere with performance by the party to be *459 charged and still enforce the letter of the contract. 1
If placing a frozen ceiling on the wages which plaintiff was permitted to pay and at the same time permitting the party instituting the freeze to pay higher wages on another tremendous project in the same neighborhood, which the officials must have known would absorb all the available labor in that area, is not interfering, then I have read the definitions in the law and secular lexicons to no purpose.
It is to plaintiff’s credit that he minimized the damages by paying overtime rates.
I would allow plaintiff to recover at least the excess labor costs during the period, of the freeze.
In any event, I would authorize a trial commissioner to take evidence on this phase of the case. Since the case is to be assigned to a trial commissioner, I agree that it may be sent generally.
. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 315; Williston on Contracts, sec. 1293A; Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 , 14 S.Ct. 876 , 38 L.Ed. 814 ; LeVeque v. United States, 96 Ct.Cl. 250 ; Beuttas v. United States, 60 F.Supp. 771 , 101 Ct.Cl. 748 (rev. on other grounds 324 U.S. 768 , 65 S.Ct. 1000 , 89 L.Ed. 1354 ; Sunswick Corp. of Del. v. United States, 75 F.Supp. 221 , 109 Ct.Cl. 772 ; York Engineering & Const. Co. v. United States, 62 F.Supp. 546 , 103 Ct.Cl. 613 , certiorari denied 327 U.S. 784 , 66 S.Ct. 700 , 90 L.Ed. 1011 .