stating that a defendant’s presence when and where contraband is found is a factor to be considered in determining whether defendant had knowledge of that contraband’s existence
How later courts described this case
- stating that a defendant’s presence when and where contraband is found is a factor to be considered in determining whether defendant had knowledge of that contraband’s existence
- affirming the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana where the evidence showed that the drugs were found in the defendant’s dresser drawer
- “[M]ere presence in the place [where the contraband is found] is not sufficient proof of intent to possess the substance.” (internal quotation marks omit- ted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the affirmance of both convictions. With reference to Senteney, however, I do so only because certain evidentia-ry elements missing in Martin v. State (2d Dist. 1978) Ind.App., 372 N.E.2d 1194 , are present in this case. More specifically, contraband was found in a box on top of the bureau located in the only bedroom in the house. That evidence permitted the trier of fact to infer that Senteney was in possession of the marijuana.
• Notwithstanding the weakness or implausibility of the isolated statement by the police officer that the box was found on top of the dresser, the trial court was entitled to believe that statement as opposed to the officer’s earlier and repeated statements that the only box found was located in a drawer. The fact that I would not have given credence to the isolated statement does not permit me to say as a matter of law that the trial judge could not have believed it.
*100 In conclusion I must take issue with Judge Buchanan’s analysis of and reliance upon Ledcke v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 382 , 296 N.E.2d 412 . As he correctly observes, Ledcke involved a “manufacturing situation”, i. e., marijuana virtually covered the kitchen floor and was being processed and dried in the oven. The case does not support the broad generalization made by Judge Buchanan that the Ledcke court had concluded “that in a place where illegal activity occurs, a rebuttable inference of knowledge arises.”