The opinion
GALLAGHER, Senior Judge,
concurring in the result:
I agree that appellant should be granted an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on his petition. The evidence adduced at that hearing would afford a basis for determining the reliability of the informant’s letter.
While I agree that in this instance appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing so the trial court can make findings of fact, I am concerned that we not open doors that should not — as a matter of sound judgment — be opened in the prisons. Prisoners are entitled to elementary fairness but we should be hesitant to equate or come close to equating prisoners’ procedural rights with the procedural rights of individuals who are not in prison. The Supreme Court has been vigilant about this.
“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 , 68 S.Ct. 1049 , 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). For example, there is no “constitutional or inherent right to parole,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), and “the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Although prisoners are entitled to basic procedural rights, these rights must be properly balanced with restrictions appropriate to a prison population, taking into account-the problems peculiar to that setting. Further, it is necessary that prison officials be given broad discretionary authority to run the prison. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 , 103 S.Ct. 864 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). “[T]o hold ... that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of federal courts.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 , 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).
The Supreme Court in Hewitt, supra, specifically dealt with the issue of a prisoner’s rights regarding placement in administrative segregation. 1 Hewitt made it very clear that “in determining what is due process in the prison context, one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society to the very different situations presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 461 , 103 S.Ct. 864 . Following a prison riot in a Pennsylvania state prison, the prisoner (Helms) was removed from the general prison population and was placed in administrative segregation pending an investigation into his role in the riot. The issue presented to the court was whether the prisoner’s rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The court held that although a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, the minimum due process requirements will be satisfied as long as the inmate receives “some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison officials charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.” Id. at 476 , 103 S.Ct. 864 .
In the present case the Lorton Housing Board complied with the requirements established in the Lorton Regulations Approval Act of 1982 (LRAA) 2 and those regulations complied with Hewitt . Appel *141 lant was placed in administrative segregation upon discovery of the anonymous note and pending a housing hearing. Appellant received a hearing and was given an opportunity to explain his version of the story. The Board reviewed the evidence and determined that appellant posed an “escape risk” and “threat to self and others” and placed him in administrative segregation. Accordingly, it appears the steps taken by the Lorton prison officials were in conformity with the requirements established by the Supreme Court in Hewitt .
Appellant would be entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing in the trial court only for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the informant’s note. The prison officials did not violate any of the requirements of Hewitt . Appellant’s entitlement to a hearing is solely predicated on the law laid down by a number of circuits, which makes it clear that due process requires that some indicia of reliability be established before accepting confidential information as the basis for a prison disciplinary decision. See, e.g., Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 277 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that the record must demonstrate “at a minimum that the disciplinary committee determined for itself, on some reasoned basis, that information received from confidential informants was reliable”); Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that the court must be able to determine “that the disciplinary committee concluded the informant was credible or his information was reliable based on some underlying factual information”). Because the Lorton officials did not adequately test the reliability of the letter, I would agree that appellant should be given a hearing in the trial court for that purpose.
In the case at hand it does not appear in the record that there was evidence corroborating the informant’s letter which alleged that appellant was planning an escape and an attack on a female prison guard. For this particular reason, appellant should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing at the trial court level. Following receipt of the informant’s letter, prison officials conducted a thorough search of appellant and his cell, looking for evidence to support the informant's assertion that appellant was planning an escape from prison. No evidence of any contraband was found. So far as it appears in our record, the only basis for accepting the letter as reliable was the letter itself and a memorandum from the prison official who received the anonymous letter from another official which described the note and emphasized the need to place the prisoner in administrative segregation.
This is not sufficient to establish reliability. There is no indication in the record that the investigating officer took an oath as to the truthfulness of the letter; there was no corroborating evidence such as other documents or statements from witnesses; and there was no indication that the prison officials had first hand knowledge of the informant’s letter or a past record of reliability on the informant. See Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir.1985). So far as it appears, the Housing Board of Lorton made its decision to place appellant in administrative segregation solely based on the anonymous letter.
Accordingly, I agree the case should be remanded so that there can be a hearing in the trial court on the reliability issue. In so doing, however, I hardly agree that this case at all presents an issue going to the measure of our civilization, as the majority seems to imply. The circumstances here hardly measure a draconian analogy.
. Although the circumstances regarding the placement of the prisoner in Hewitt are different from the present case, the legal premise is the same. The court there established the rights afforded to a prisoner prior to placement in administrative segregation.
. 29 D.C.Reg. 3484 (1982).