The opinion
*989 BROOK, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion on the timeliness issue, which I believe to be dispositive. I would reverse the Commission's discharge of Aguilera on the basis that Dr. Raykovich did not report Aguilera's positive test result to the ECFD within four days of receiving the test result. 10
"When asked to interpret an ordinance, this court will apply the same principles as those employed for the construction of statutes." T.W. Thom Constr. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts.... [When the language is susceptible to more than one construction, we must construe the statute to determine the apparent legislative intent. The task of appellate courts with respect to statutory interpretation has been summarized as follows: We ascertain and implement legislative intent by giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language used in the statute. The statute is examined and interpreted as a whole and the language itself is scrutinized, including the grammatical structure of the clause or sentence at issue.
State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (2001) (paragraph format altered and citations and quotation marks omitted). "[Aln agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations which the ageney is charged to enforce is entitled to some weight [but] if an ageney's interpretation is erroneous, it is entitled to no weight." Miller Brewing Co. v. Bartholomew County Beverage Co., 674 N.E.2d 193, 200 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted), trans. denied (1997). "Ultimately ... courts are charged with the responsibility of resolving questions of statutory interpretation and thus are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or rule." Id. '
Any citizen or taxpayer may bring charges against an ECFD employee. See East Cuicacgo, Inp., Cope ch. 2.22 (1982) (providing that no employee of the ECFD may be "removed, suspended, demoted or discharged exeept for cause, and only upon the written accusation of the appointing power, or any citizen or taxpayer. ...") (adopted December 30, 1982, by East Chicago Ordinance 3839; formerly Ind.Code § 19-1-37.5-7 (repealed 1981)) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Commission rule entitled "Time Limitation on Charges" provides in relevant part that "[alnyone bringing charges against another individual shall put in writing the charge within four (4) calendar days of the possible violation and shall deliver said charge to his superior officer."
Adopting the reasoning of the Commission, the majority assumes that the "his" in "his superior officer" refers to the person bringing charges. In order to reconcile the rest of the rule with this assumption, the majority concludes that "anyone" refers only to ECFD employees. The ef-feet of this interpretation, of course, is that the four-day rule does not apply to citizens and taxpayers.
As previously noted, the rule clearly applies to "[a@lnyone bringing charges[.]" Given that citizens and taxpayers at large do not have superior officers, the only reasonable interpretation of "Ais superior *990 officer" is as a reference to the employee against whom the charges are being brought. My interpretation of the rule is that anyone, citizens and taxpayers at large included, who brings charges against an ECFD employee must do so within the four-day limit and must deliver the charges to the alleged violator's superior officer.
The majority's interpretation of the rule renders the four-day limit essentially meaningless. Under that interpretation, if an ECFD employee becomes aware of a violation but fails to report it within four days, the employee could simply recruit a citizen or taxpayer at large to report the alleged violation on the employee's behalf. That citizen or taxpayer would be able to report the alleged violation at any time. This is clearly an absurd and unacceptable result. Because Dr. Raykovich failed to report Aguilera's positive test result to Aguilera's superior officer within four days of receiving the result, I would reverse on that basis.
. See East Imp. Cope ch. 2.64.160 (1997) ("An employee who has a verified positive test result or who refuses to undergo testing shall be terminated from employment. 'Such termination shall not be imposed on an employee who requests and agrees to participate in an employee assistance program (EAP), including evaluation and rehabilitation and who agrees to follow-up testing as required by Section 2.64.140 of this chapter.").