Opinion

In Re the Marriage of Stariha

  • 509 N.E.2d 1117
  • 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 2786
Court
Indiana Court of Appeals
Filed
Jun 29, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Staton
On the bench
Ratliff, Neal, Staton
Cited by
32 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.1%

holding question of whether father was denied due process when he was jailed for thirty days for indirect contempt without being informed of his right to counsel at the hearing was of great public importance, likely to recur, and likely to continue to evade review

How later courts described this case

  • holding question of whether father was denied due process when he was jailed for thirty days for indirect contempt without being informed of his right to counsel at the hearing was of great public importance, likely to recur, and likely to continue to evade review
  • holding that a father’s appeal of his contempt conviction for failure to pay child support was not moot, even though his sentence had been served, because of “possible collateral consequences”
  • noting that Lassiter does not require the court to address the Mathews factors where the litigant risks the loss of physical liberty
  • holding that "we will not reverse a trial court's determination 'where absolutely no change in the status quo will result.""

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

STATON, Judge,

concurring.

I concur with the Majority that an indigent defendant has a due process right to legal counsel where there is a possibility that he may be incarcerated. However, I am troubled with the mechanics of identifying the fundamental right in civil cases prior to a hearing or trial. The presump *1124 tion is that it is not necessary to appoint counsel in civil cases. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 ; Kennedy v. Wood (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 1367 . To avoid the unnecessary waste of judicial time as well as other resources, some guidelines should be offered to the trial court.

When an indigent defendant appears before the trial court, the trial judge would be well advised to review the pleadings before him and the applicable law to determine whether the possibility of incarceration exists. If the trial judge determines that the possibility exists, he should satisfy himself of the indigencey and appoint legal counsel for the defendant. If the defendant insists on going pro se then the trial judge should employ the same or similar procedure used for criminal defendants. See Shelton v. State (1979), 181 Ind.App. 50 , 390 N.E.2d 1048 , trans. den.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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