finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff alleged that diocese should have assessed the possibility that contacting her to discuss possible sexual abuse she endured as a child might cause her emotional distress
How later courts described this case
- finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff alleged that diocese should have assessed the possibility that contacting her to discuss possible sexual abuse she endured as a child might cause her emotional distress
- refusing to toll statute of limitations based on plaintiff’s claim that “her mental illnesses and homelessness made it difficult for her to sue”
- “To establish equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel must demonstrate that: (1) the other party misrepresented or concealed material facts ____”
- plaintiff’s claim that “defendants’ conduct rendered her ‘psychiatrically unable’ to take legal action” did not amount to a legal disability for purposes of equitable tolling
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I agree with the result in this case. I write separately because I do not endorse the reasoning by which the majority arrives at its conclusion. The majority determines that the victim’s claims for childhood sexual abuse are time-barred based solely on Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603 (2000). I continue to adhere to my belief that Clay was wrongly decided. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 615-22 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J.). Nevertheless, the facts in this case differ so dramatically from the facts in Clay, that I concur that dismissal is appropriate here.
As the majority correctly holds, it is impossible to conclude that the victim in this case was, as she contends, unaware of any injury until early 1995. The victim specifically alleges in her complaint that she was “filled with shame and guilt and horror” at the thought of moving in with her abuser in 1971. Her abuser at various times held a knife to her throat, threatened her with a gun, beat her with his hands and a metal chair and engaged in sexual activities with her by force. Moreover, after becoming pregnant plaintiff aborted the fetus as a result of physical assault by her abuser and, when taken to a hospital, was informed that she had very nearly died. These facts differ markedly from those alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint in Clay. Cf. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 608-09 (victim alleged that the sexual contact with her abuser was not forcible and that she was never physically harmed). Accordingly, the rule illegitimately applied in Clay correctly operates to bar plaintiffs complaint in this case. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 611-13 (“discovery rule” delays commencement of limitations period only until the plaintiff becomes aware of some injury, not until the plaintiff realizes the full extent of her injuries), citing Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995).