holding that "[a] party who is not examining a witness cannot use a motion to strike as a means of objection to a question after it has been answered."
How later courts described this case
- holding that "[a] party who is not examining a witness cannot use a motion to strike as a means of objection to a question after it has been answered."
- $235,000 for burns to the body
- concurrently applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 417 and an “imminently dangerous” standard
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring Opinion
White, J.
My brother judge has executed with commendable dispatch and skill the herculean task imposed on him by the statute which mandates us to “give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record . . . and the decision of the Court therein”. Hunter v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 202 Ind. 328 , 174 N. E. 287 (1930). It is to be hoped that the electorate will approve, at the next general election, the proposed judicial reform amendment (H.J.R. 6, Acts 1967, ch. 375, p. 1359) to Article YII of the Constitution of Indiana which will, inter alia, repeal the constitutional imposition of that duty upon the Supreme Court and not impose it upon the Court of Appeals which it will create to replace this court. Thereafter, presumably, the opinions written by justices and judges exercising appellate jurisdiction will discuss only those alleged errors of trial courts which the writing jurist feels will make a constructive contribution to the administration of justice.
Of the fourteen propositions Judge Sharp was required to discuss, only that one dealing with the validity of the advance payment device employed by NIPSCO and appellee, and whether its effect was prejudicial to NIPSCO’s co-appellant, possesses sufficient novelty and possibility of error to be worthy of an opinion. In that portion of the opinion, I unreservedly concur.
The rulings of the trial court involved in the remaining propositions, even though some may have been technically *223 incorrect, did not deprive either appellant of a fair trial. Under the provisions of Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, § 659, (Burns IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-3231), we could not have reversed for any mere technical error when the merits of the cause were thus fairly tried and determined. In concurring in the result only, I do not intend to express disapproval of the opinion’s disposition of any alleged error, but merely wish to avoid approving any trial court ruling or jury instruction in the abstract, when, as I believe, the possibility exists that in the context of a different case a different statement might be more appropriate.
Note. — Reported in 250 N. E. 2d 378 .