a breach of duty may be proved by circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences, but the mere fact alcohol was served to an intoxicated person is insufficient in proof because the action is based upon service to a person visibly intoxicated
How later courts described this case
- a breach of duty may be proved by circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences, but the mere fact alcohol was served to an intoxicated person is insufficient in proof because the action is based upon service to a person visibly intoxicated
- a lay witness is generally permitted to testify under MRE 701 with respect to his or her opinion regarding whether a person was intoxicated
- plaintiff who knowingly rides with intoxicated person is comparatively negligent and award will be reduced by amount of negligence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
R. M. Maher, P.J.
(concurring in part and dis- *155 seating in part). I respectfully dissent from the non sequitur of the majority in No. 88268 by which application of Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507 ; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), through Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181 ; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), precludes application of Salim v LaGuire, 138 Mich App 334 ; 361 NW2d 9 (1984), and O’Dowd v General Motors Corp, 419 Mich 597 ; 358 NW2d 553 (1984). Putney requires us to uphold the dram-shop judgment against Stevens. I see no inequity in doing so therefore observe no reason to balance-out Putney’s effect by denying application of Salim and O’Dowd . Moreover, I see nothing in the jury verdict which would warrant the majority’s decision to withhold application of Salim and O’Dowd . The injury in this case was indivisible and could not have occurred without the negligence of both defendants. Under these circumstances, joint and several liability is intended to fully compensate the victim, not fairly tax the tortfeasor. See generally, 65 CJS, Negligence, § 102, pp 1117-1127. I would apply joint and several liability to the judgment.