Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Commonwealth

DISSENTING OPINION

NIGRO, Justice,

dissenting.

In this action, both the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge. However, the majority concludes that claimant failed to prove her mental injury resulted from an abnormal working condition. In reaching its decision, the majority ignores the line of cases in the Commonwealth Court where benefits were awarded to claimants who encountered work events that triggered mental disability. Further, the majority disregards the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Judge, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and Commonwealth Court. As such, I believe the majority is engaging in mere error review by reversing the Commonwealth Court’s finding that claimant suffered a psychic injury as a result of abnormal working conditions. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

In other cases, the Commonwealth Court has affirmed the award of benefits to claimants who pointed to actual work events which precipitated a mental disability. In Bevilacqua v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (J. Bevilacqua Sons, Inc.), 82 Pa.Cmwlth. 511 , 475 A.2d 959 (1984), a worker who had encountered increased responsibility on a new job and mental disability resulted received benefits. In Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Fisher), 91 Pa.Cmwlth. 480 , 498 A.2d 3 (1985), *44 increased job responsibility due to loss of an assistant and an accumulation of work were deemed sufficient to award benefits. Further, mental injuries resulting from stressful conditions which included public reprimands by supervisors were found to be compensable. Bell Telephone Company of Pa. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (DeMay), 87 Pa. Cmwlth. 558, 487 A.2d 1058 (1985); McDonough v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Com. of Pa., Dept. of Transp.), 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 1 , 470 A.2d 1099 (1984).

It is well-settled that when reviewing workers’ compensation cases the appellate court’s role is not to reweigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses; rather, the reviewing court should determine whether, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, the referee’s findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Skirpan), 531 Pa. 287 , 612 A.2d 434 (1992). Further, the referee has the power as the factfinder to determine credibility and to accept or reject the testimony of any witness. Harman Coal Company v. Dunmyre, 474 Pa. 610, 613 , 379 A.2d 533, 534 (1977). The referee is the judge of credibility and it is within the referee’s province to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical .witness. Gateway Coal Company v. W.C.A.B. (Laboda), 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 332 , 588 A.2d 73 , allocatur denied, 528 Pa. 633 , 598 A.2d 286 (1991).

Here, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found that the testimony of claimant’s co-worker and her division manager to be credible, as their testimony supported claimant’s assertions regarding changes and increases in her workload. Additionally, the Workers’ Compensation Judge explicitly noted as credible the testimony of Dr. Slayton, claimant’s treating psychiatrist. Dr. Slayton testified that increases in claimant’s work duties, responsibilities and hours worked as a result of the inter-regional merger resulted in an abnormally excessive workload for claimant. Accordingly, the Judge concluded that:

Claimant sustained her burden of proof that she became disabled on June 6, 1988 due to depression caused by a *45 change in her working conditions. (Conclusion of Law No. 1)

Despite that specific conclusion, the majority, as a matter of law, determines that appellee’s mental injury was not work-related.

Thus, I dissent, and would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court awarding benefits to the appellee.