finding no error in the admission of police officer’s testimony where the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the officer’s testimony was introduced for the limited purpose of explaining what caused the police to act and that they were not to accept the truth of the witness’s statement to the officer
How later courts described this case
- finding no error in the admission of police officer’s testimony where the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the officer’s testimony was introduced for the limited purpose of explaining what caused the police to act and that they were not to accept the truth of the witness’s statement to the officer
- finding no error where a police officer’s testimony regarding his conversation with the defendant’s brother was admissible to show the officers’ conduct and the court instructed the jury to consider the testimony for the limited purpose of explaining the officers’ actions rather than the truth of the statement
- stating “a police officer may testify about his conversations with others, such as victims or witnesses, when such testimony is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the other, but is used to show the investigative steps taken by the officer”
- finding testimony describing the progress of a police investigation is admissible even if it suggests that a nontestifying witness implicated the defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
I do not agree with the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s death sentence must be vacated because of instructional error committed during the first stage of the sentencing hearing.
In the case at bar, the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty was premised on the statutory aggravating circumstance found in section 9 — 1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961, murder in the course of a specified felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(6)). Without objection, the jurors were told that the death penalty could be imposed if they found that the murder occurred during the commission of certain offenses, including, erroneously, residential burglary. Although burglary was among the felonies then specified in section 9 — 1(b)(6), residential burglary was not, and the instructions were erroneous to that extent. At the conclusion of the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury found the defendant eligible for the death sentence, using a general verdict form to memorialize its finding. The jury subsequently determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence, and the trial judge accordingly sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant argues, and the majority agrees, that the failure of the jury instructions to correctly specify the felonies that would sustain an eligibility determination under section 9 — 1(b)(6) must nullify the sentence.
The majority acknowledges that the evidence presented below “was not closely balanced.” (143 Ill. 2d at 170.) Nonetheless, the' court chooses to vacate the defendant’s death sentence because, in the majority’s view, the gravity of the asserted error denied the defendant a fair sentencing hearing. In support of its holding, the majority invokes the rule that a general verdict resting on alternative grounds, one of which is invalid, may be reversed if the reviewing court cannot determine with sufficient certainty that the jury relied on a valid basis for its decision. (See Stromberg v. California (1931), 283 U.S. 359 , 75 L. Ed. 1117 , 51 S. Ct. 532 .) Without inquiring whether an error of that nature may ever be waived, the majority simply assumes that the error committed in the present case was sufficiently serious that another sentencing hearing is now required.
The defendant did not object to the jury instructions used during the first stage of the sentencing hearing. (Cf. People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233 (defendant preserved similar error by making timely, appropriate objection).) In other circumstances, an objection to a Stromberg defect in jury instructions has been held necessary to preserve the error for purposes of review. (See, e.g., United States v. Washington (2d Cir. 1988), 861 F.2d 350, 352-53 .) In view of the strong evidence establishing the present defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, I would conclude that the defect in the instructions did not rise to the level of plain error and therefore may be deemed to have been waived.
During the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury was fully informed of the offenses committed by the defendant in the present case. The State presented evidence of the defendant’s convictions both on multiple counts of felony murder and on the attendant felonies. The additional offenses included aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and residential burglary; all but residential burglary would render the defendant eligible for the death penalty under the version of section 9 — 1(b)(6) at issue here. Certified copies of the defendant’s convictions were admitted without objection, and the defendant raised no challenge to that evidence, or to the erroneous jury instructions.
In the present case, the defendant failed completely to call the trial judge’s attention to the error in the instructions used at the sentencing hearing. The evidence clearly established the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty pursuant to the same statutory aggravating circumstance on several separate grounds. I would conclude, under the standard for review of constitutional error (see Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 ), that the defect in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Clemons v. Mississippi (1990), 494 U.S. 738, 753-54 , 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 741-42 , 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1451 .
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.