concluding courts presented with the issue have found that the process of tattooing is neither speech nor even symbolic speech
How later courts described this case
- concluding courts presented with the issue have found that the process of tattooing is neither speech nor even symbolic speech
- tattooing for artistic purposes is not protected by the First Amendment because it is neither speech nor symbolic speech
- tattooing is not speech or even symbolic speech
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge,
dissent ing.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
It is only where a statute is ambiguous or more than one construction is possible that the reviewing court will construe that statute. Johnson v. LaPorte Bank & Trust Co., (1984) Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 350 . Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court on review has the duty to give effect to the plain meaning of that statute. Indiana Collectors v. Conrad, (1984) Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 768 . As applicable to the facts of this case the clear and unambiguous language of IND. CODE 25-22.5-1.-1(a)(1), in defining the practice of medicine, requires tattocing to be accompained with a specific intent.
*40 I am of the opinion that the trial court's judgment 1 correctly applied the statute in question.
The judgment should be affirmed.
. Counsel for appellant was remiss in failing to include a verbatim statement of the judgment in the brief. A.P. 8.3(A)(4). Flagrant violation of the rules may cause an appeal to be dismissed. See: Begley v. Begley, (1982) Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 125 at 127 .