explaining that the judicial decisions enforcing the limitations on the Com *755 monwealth Court’s jurisdiction to redress contract breaches involving a Commonwealth agency “are founded on the legislature’s delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to hear contractual matters involving the Commonwealth to the Board of Claims, and the nature of that statute as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the judicial decisions enforcing the limitations on the Com *755 monwealth Court’s jurisdiction to redress contract breaches involving a Commonwealth agency “are founded on the legislature’s delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to hear contractual matters involving the Commonwealth to the Board of Claims, and the nature of that statute as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity”
- explaining that the judicial decisions enforcing the limitations on the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction to redress contract breaches involving a Commonwealth agency “are founded on the legislature’s delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to hear contractual matters involving the Commonwealth to the Board of Claims, and the nature of that statute as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity”
- monetary damages or specific performance sought
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree that this case should have been brought in the Board of Claims, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to treat appellant’s direct appeal from the Commonwealth Court’s dismissal of this case as a petition for allowance of appeal. Section 723(a) of the Judicial Code provides:
“The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the Commonwealth Court entered in any matter which was originally commenced in said court and which does not constitute an appeal to the Commonwealth Court from another court, a district justice or another governmental unit.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 723(a). The present case was in fact “originally commenced” in the Commonwealth Court, and our determination that the case should have been brought in the Board of Claims in no respect alters this fact. * Because the *414 majority’s treatment of appellant’s direct appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal manifestly disregards the express legislative conferral of direct appellate jurisdiction upon this Court, I concur only in the result.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this concurring opinion.
Had the Commonwealth Court transferred the case to the Board of Claims instead of granting appellees’ motion to dismiss, the proper *414 procedure would have been for appellant to petition in the Board of Claims for retransfer or to file a petition for review with this Court. See Note to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Only if appellant had in fact commenced its case in the Board of Claims and then unsuccessfully appealed to the Commonwealth Court would the filing of a petition' for allowance of appeal be appropriate.