applying the principle to statutory construction, noting that a “statute should be construed so that general language does not apply to matters covered by more specific language”
How later courts described this case
- applying the principle to statutory construction, noting that a “statute should be construed so that general language does not apply to matters covered by more specific language”
- "References to other statutes is particularly appropriate when the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body, at the same session."
- if Council intended such a dramatic change in law, “it is reasonable to assume that there would have been at least some specific reference to it in the language of the Act or, at least, within its legislative history”
- “If the Council had intended to effect such a dramatic change ..., it is reasonable to assume that there would have been at least some specific reference to it in the language of the Act or, at least, within its legislative history.” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TERRY, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint, but solely on the *280 ground that “the Council’s solicitation of and reliance upon the Corporation Counsel’s opinion ... shows that it declined to enact the proposed bills despite its having been informed that the Act did not cover gender-based insurance rates.” Ante at 279. I also agree with part V of Judge Belson’s opinion. However, I specifically do not agree with the view that “the better interpretation of the Human Rights Act is that it does not encompass actuarial rating practices_” Ante at 276. As the majority recognizes in the very next sentence, there is “some persuasion” in appellants’ argument to the contrary; indeed, I find it quite persuasive. Were it not for what I regard as clear evidence of legislative intent, I would probably vote to reverse.