The opinion
KELLY, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority opinion is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with prior opinions of this Court. See Commonwealth v. Weeks, 381 Pa.Super. 411 , 554 A.2d 68 (1989); Commonwealth v. Hewett, 380 Pa.Super. 334 , 551 A.2d 1080 (1988); see also Reilly v. SEPTA, 507 Pa. 204 , 489 A.2d 1291 (1985); Commonwealth v. Vance, 376 Pa.Super. 493 , 546 A.2d 682 (1988).
The juvenile defendants in these consolidated cases have made no attempt to establish a nexus between Judge Cunningham’s alleged and proven misconduct and the dispositions of various motions which they challenge. Review of the record in each case reveals no such nexus, no errors of law, and no apparent abuse of discretion with respect to these cases. I find no basis to vacate orders entered by Judge Cunningham prior to her removal from the bench without establishing a clear nexus between her alleged and proven misconduct and the challenged orders. See Commonwealth v. Hewett, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Weeks, supra (following Hewett).
I note that the eases relied upon by the majority to reach a contrary conclusion fall into two g'eneral categories: cases involving pre-disposition motions for recusal due to an appearance of impropriety; and, eases involving pas-i-disposition motions for new proceedings when a clear nexus between judicial misconduct and the challenged disposition had been established. Because I find neither category applicable to the cases presented here, I find the cases cited inapposite, and the conclusion reached by the majority unsupported.
Based upon the foregoing, I dissent.