stating that “[t]his Court is not in the habit of overruling cases without stating that it intends to do so” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[t]his Court is not in the habit of overruling cases without stating that it intends to do so” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “not every error committed during a trial is reversible error.”
- suggesting that the trial court "resolve a 'doubtful' and/or 'marginal' voir dire question in favor of the party who has requested that it be asked.”
- noting that “where ... no police or other official witnesses will be called by the State, the occupational, or status, question need not be asked”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MURPHY, J.,
concurring.
I am in complete agreement with the holding “that the trial court erred when it failed, upon the defendant’s request to ask the Defense-Witness question during voir dire.” I write separately, however, to repeat two suggestions made in the concurring opinion I filed in Curtin v. State, 165 Md.App. 60 , 884 A.2d 758 (2005), aff'd, 393 Md. 593 , 903 A.2d 922 (2006). In my effort to reduce the chances that a conviction will be reversed on the ground that the defendant was entitled to a voir dire question that the Circuit Court refused to ask, I stated:
My first suggestion is that the circuit court resolve a “doubtful” and/or “marginal” voir dire question in favor of *669 the party who has requested that it be asked. In the case at bar, asking the question at issue would have resulted in a more efficient use of judicial resources.
My second suggestion is that the circuit court analyze a proposed voir dire question by applying a test that is derived from the (no longer permissible) “compound question” test articulated as follows in Davis, supra, 93 Md.App. at 121-22, 611 A.2d 1008 :
[A] compound question probing both A) the existence of a condition and B) the likely consequence of that condition has been deemed legally appropriate and required.
This general rule applies, whatever the particular subject matter may be. The variation consists of nothing more than filling in a blank with respect to Condition A. Condition A, of course, can be anything. “Are you now or have you ever been a member of [the American Red Cross, ... ]?” Component B is a constant. “... and would such condition make it impossible (or difficult) to return a fair and impartial verdict based only upon the evidence in this case?” An affirmative answer to Consequence B is always a ground for disqualification, whatever its cause.
A modification of this test is required because, in Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000), the Court of Appeals abolished the “compound question” rule. The modification, however, merely requires that there be (1) a direct inquiry into the existence of any condition the reason ably likely consequence of which would impair a prospective juror’s ability to return a fair and impartial verdict based only upon the evidence presented in open court, and (2) as to any prospective juror who responds in the affirmative to that inquiry, appropriate “follow up” questions that focus upon the consequences of the particular condition.
*670 ... When presented with a particular voir dire question, the trial judge should ask himself or herself, “does this question probe for a condition that would be likely to impair a juror’s ability to decide this case on the evidence presented?” If the answer to that question is “yes,” the question should be asked.
Had this test been applied in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002), the circuit court would have concluded that, in a case in which the defendant has been charged with selling drugs to an undercover officer, it is likely that a prospective juror’s attitude about drugs would impair his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Had this test been applied in Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1 , 806 A.2d 265 (2002), the circuit court would have concluded that a defendant charged with the sexual child abuse of his girlfriend’s eleven year old daughter was entitled to a voir dire question that asked the venire, “Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” Had this test been applied in Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600 , 853 A.2d 796 (2004), the circuit court would have concluded that, in an assault case involving the defenses of “self-defense” and “defense of others,” it is likely that a prospective juror’s attitude about handguns would impair his or her ability to be fair and impartial when deciding whether those defenses are available to a defendant who used a handgun to shoot the alleged victim. Had this test been applied in Logan v. State, 164 Md.App. 1 , 882 A.2d 330 (2005), the circuit court would have concluded that, in a murder case in which thé defendant has filed a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, it is likely that a prospective juror’s attitude about the “insanity defense” would impair his or her ability to be fair and impartial.
165 Md.App. at 76-79 , 884 A.2d at 767-769 . (Murphy, C.J., concurring).
*671 I am persuaded that, had this test been applied in the case at bar, the Circuit Court would have concluded that the Petitioner was entitled to a voir dire question directed at uncovering bias against witnesses for the defense.