holding that a trial court erred by granting summary judgment against an IIED claim when the employee faced severe and continual sexual harassment over a three-month period
How later courts described this case
- holding that a trial court erred by granting summary judgment against an IIED claim when the employee faced severe and continual sexual harassment over a three-month period
- stating temporal proximity may establish causation where complaint and adverse action “are separated by weeks, as opposed to months and years”
- noting that over a three-month period, employer repeatedly threatened to fire employee if she did not succumb to sexual advances
- noting that Texas Labor Code section 21.055 is interpreted in accordance with parallel provisions of Title VII
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MARGARET GARNER MIRABAL, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Appellant Maria Fields brought suit under two sections of the Texas Labor Code: section 21.051 prohibits sexual harassment and gender discrimination by an “employer,” and section 21.055 prohibits retaliation by an “employer” or a labor union against a person who files a complaint under chapter 21. Appellant also sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The majority opinion affirms summary judgment for the labor union as to the cause of action under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. I dissent from this holding because the summary judgment evidence raises a fact issue about whether the labor union is an “employer” under the statute. As to the remainder of the opinion, I concur in the result.
Section 21.051
The majority opinion holds that the labor union established as a matter of law that it was not an “employer” because it did not employ at least 15 employees, and therefore it was not liable under Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (Vernon 1996). Appellant argues that, viewing the local union and the international union as an “integrated enterprise,” they employ over 1000 employees, and therefore section 21.051 clearly applies.
An international and local union’s actual relationship may render the two a single entity, or render the local an agent of the international, for jurisdictional purposes. Maxwell v. Right, 974 F.Supp. 899 , 903 n. 3 (E.D.Tex.1996). To determine whether two entities should be treated as a single employer, four factors are to be considered: (1) the interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership of financial control. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 450 (5th Cir.1994); Herman v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No. 971, 60 F.3d 1375, 1383 (9th Cir.1995).
The summary judgment evidence shows the following. Teamsters Local Union No. 988, was placed under a trusteeship for racketeering activities. Ron Carey, the General President of the International Union, sent Terry Lovan to Houston to take over as trustee of Local Union No. 988. When local unions are not under a trusteeship, they have the autonomy to operate and run themselves. However, during the period of trusteeship, a local union is under the direction of the international union and loses its autonomy. The president of the International Union had the authority to involve himself in the staffing decisions of Local Union No. 988 during the trusteeship. Terry Lovan, as trustee, was in full charge of the affairs of the local union, under the direction of Ron Carey, the General President. When Lovan had legal questions, he called the International Union’s lawyers. WThen appellant Fields made complaints about Lovan, the International Union investigated the allegations. A local union does not operate as a “local” until an election occurs for a new president and executive board. Fields alleged she was sexually harassed, she complained about the harassment, and the retaliatory decision was made to fire her, all before the election of the new president occurred.
The summary judgment evidence also shows that, in addition to Lovan, there were at least three other International Union employees working at Local 988. Doug Collier was an “IBT representative” who answered to the General President’s office. Sergio Ponce and Dan Basham were also International Union employees working with the local union.
In my opinion, the summary judgment evidence raises a fact issue about whether the actual relationship between Local Union No. 988 and the International Union *536 rendered the two a single entity or “integrated enterprise” for jurisdictional purposes. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir.1983). Accordingly, summary judgment on this ground was improperly granted.
I would reverse the summary judgment in toto and remand the whole case to the trial court for further proceedings.