noting that "the continued viability of the specific jurisdictional holding in Angel [that city police officers' jurisdiction is coextensive with the county sheriff's] may be open to question" because the court based its decision on precise language in former articles 998 and 999 equating the jurisdiction of city police officers with that of the city marshal, whose jurisdiction matched that of the county sheriff; that language was carried over into Local Government Code section 341.001 but then amended in 1995 to provide that a Type A general-law city police officer's jurisdiction is that "granted to or imposed on a peace officer by the Code of Criminal Procedure"
How later courts described this case
- noting that "the continued viability of the specific jurisdictional holding in Angel [that city police officers' jurisdiction is coextensive with the county sheriff's] may be open to question" because the court based its decision on precise language in former articles 998 and 999 equating the jurisdiction of city police officers with that of the city marshal, whose jurisdiction matched that of the county sheriff; that language was carried over into Local Government Code section 341.001 but then amended in 1995 to provide that a Type A general-law city police officer's jurisdiction is that "granted to or imposed on a peace officer by the Code of Criminal Procedure"
- holding that jurisdiction of a type B municipality police officer is controlled by common-law geographical limitation of city limits
- holding that subsections (d) and (g) of article 14.03 extend peace officers’ geographic authority
- applying non-constitutional error harm analysis because source of error was trial court’s application of Texas statutory and common law, not its application of constitutional principles
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GRAY, Justice,
dissenting.
Pantego officers never lost sight of Yeager after they had a proper basis for detention in their jurisdiction. They pursued him for further observation. He crossed the boundary of Pantego. Upon observing additional dangerous driving, they detained Yeager and determined that he was intoxicated and arrested him for driving while intoxicated in Pantego. Even though the “pursuit” was not at a high rate of speed, or with flashing lights and sirens, the doctrine commonly known as “hot pursuit” by which law enforcement officers are allowed to make an arrest of a suspect in another jurisdiction for a crime occurring in their jurisdiction is appropriately applied to these facts. See Duenez v. State, 735 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd). The conviction should be affirmed. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.