Opinion

Commonwealth v. Evans

  • 443 Pa. Super. 351
  • 661 A.2d 881
  • 1995 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1784
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 27, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Hoffman
On the bench
Wieand, Beck, Hoffman
Cited by
16 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.9%

holding that officer had probable cause when appellee opened the car door and officer saw a brick-shaped object covered in plastic, the brick-shaped object was partially concealed under the driver’s seat, and appellee had nervous demeanor”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that officer had probable cause when appellee opened the car door and officer saw a brick-shaped object covered in plastic, the brick-shaped object was partially concealed under the driver’s seat, and appellee had nervous demeanor”
  • relying on officer’s training and experience that “a brick-shaped object covered in plastic” was likely to contain narcotics
  • probable cause to search where officer observed brick of marijuana in plain view during valid traffic stop

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HOFFMAN, Judge,

dissenting:

The resolution of this case as noted by the majority, turns on the distinction between suspicion and probable cause to believe that criminal activity is afoot. In our recent decision in Benton, this court stated that an officer’s suspicion that criminal activity has occurred is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa.Super. 441 , 655 A.2d 1030 (1995). Instead, there must be reasonable and articulable grounds to support the ensuing search or seizure. Id. Our holding today directly contravenes this basic tenet to the Fourth Amendment and paves a foundation for random searches by authorities. Commonwealth v. Collini, 264 Pa.Super. 36 , 398 A.2d 1044 (1979) (“If subjective good faith alone were the test [for probable cause] the protection of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.”). Not only does Officer Snyder’s testimony demonstrate that he was unable to ascertain that the object under the driver’s seat of appellant car was narcotics, but the circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest were not consistent with drug activity. Compare Commonwealth v. Mallory, 418 Pa.Super. 614 , 614 A.2d 1174 (1992), appeal denied 533 Pa. 632 , 621 A.2d 578 (1993) (probable cause found where defendant observed standing next to identified drug dealer, holding clear plastic baggie in an area known for drug activity) with Commonwealth v. Kelly, 487 Pa. 174 , 409 A.2d 21 (1979) (no probable cause where nature of vial was not immediately apparent to police and there was no indication of *369 drug related activity). In my view, the principles encompassed in the Fourth Amendment and recently reiterated by this court in Benton require that we affirm the order of trial court. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I must respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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