reasoning that, given the advanced state of medical science, it is “unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant's ‘outrageousness’ without expert medical confirmation that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress.”
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that, given the advanced state of medical science, it is “unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant's ‘outrageousness’ without expert medical confirmation that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress.”
- stating that “it is unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant’s ‘outra-geousness’ without expert medical confirma tion that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress”
- concluding absence of expert medical testimony that plaintiff suffers from emotional distress precludes plaintiff from recovering on intentional infliction of emotional distress theory
- noting that “[t]he principle adopted in [Papieves] was derived from Restatement (First) of Torts § 868 (1939), which provides for liability to a decedent’s family member for the wanton mistreatment or intentional withholding of that decedent’s corpse.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION
PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I do not find the conduct of Appellee’s owners, agents or employees to have been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Nor is there any evidence of physical or emotional harm done to Appellants. I believe both elements must be established to support a claim for damages for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress by outrageous conduct. Because I believe that the language of Section 46 of the Restatement of Torts is most appropriate for our needs in Pennsylvania, I have no hesitancy in adopting section 46 as the law in Pennsylvania. Although the majority correctly determines that section 46 is unnecessary for a proper disposition in this case, I find no reason why we cannot announce the adoption of section 46 as the law in Pennsylvania and lay to rest the confusion that obviously exists.