reasoning that, given the advanced state of medical science, it is “unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant's ‘outrageousness’ without expert medical confirmation that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress.”
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that, given the advanced state of medical science, it is “unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant's ‘outrageousness’ without expert medical confirmation that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress.”
- stating that “it is unwise and unnecessary to permit recovery to be predicated on an inference based on the defendant’s ‘outra-geousness’ without expert medical confirma tion that the plaintiff actually suffered the claimed distress”
- concluding absence of expert medical testimony that plaintiff suffers from emotional distress precludes plaintiff from recovering on intentional infliction of emotional distress theory
- noting that “[t]he principle adopted in [Papieves] was derived from Restatement (First) of Torts § 868 (1939), which provides for liability to a decedent’s family member for the wanton mistreatment or intentional withholding of that decedent’s corpse.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not believe the new intentional tort proposed by Section 46 of Restatement of Torts 2d, *201 with its undefined parameters, has any place in either Pennsylvania precedent or policy.