reversing the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the defendant employer and remanding for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a lawful claim for workers’ compensation
How later courts described this case
- reversing the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the defendant employer and remanding for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a lawful claim for workers’ compensation
- firing in retaliation for workmen's compensation claim held to contravene public policy.
- an employer at will is not free to discharge an employee when the reason for discharge is an intention to contravene public policy
- the claim was sustained where the defendant was discharged for filing a lawful workers’ compensation claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp., 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16979 (1978)
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that the cause of action should exist and relies upon the reasoning in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 60 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);[1] and Sventko v. Kroger Company, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).[2] We decline to follow the reasoning of these cases and affirm upon authority of DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), and c…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lopus v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc, 171 Mich. App. 486 (1988)
We note, first, that Sventko and Goins are factually distinguishable from the instant case because plaintiff’s discharge was not technically in retaliation for the filing of a claim for workers’ compensation; she was, in fact, fired before her claim for compensation was filed.
The opinion
Danhof, C. J.
(dissenting). The common law of Michigan is stated by the court in Carry v Consumers Power Co, 64 Mich App 292, 296 ; 235 NW2d 765 (1975):
"An employer, in the absence of a contract, can discharge an employee at will and without cause. Dunn v Goebel Brewing Co, 357 Mich 693 ; 99 NW2d 380 (1959).” [Footnote omitted.]
Absent express provision otherwise by the Legislature or the Supreme Court, this rule applies to all discharges where the employment is at will.
The Michigan workmen’s compensation law is statutory, except for the judicial interpretations present in the case law. There is no provision that precludes an employer from discharging an employee at will after that employee has been compensated.
In the instant case, the plaintiff was discharged by her employer after she was fully compensated. *653 The discharge did not prevent the plaintiff from being compensated for her injury under the workmen’s compensation law. There is no allegation that the defendant attempted to hinder her recovery. There has been absolutely no showing that the defendant has had a practice of discharging employees after they had recovered under the workmen’s compensation law. The employment relationship was an employment at will. Thus, under the applicable common law rule, the employer could lawfully discharge the plaintiff unless he was precluded from doing so by an express provision otherwise. Carry v Consumers Power Co, supra. No such provision applies here.
The majority has in effect engaged in judicial legislation. While it may evoke some generalized sympathy, the "trail of broken bodies” argument has no relevance to the present case. As emphasized above, the plaintiff has been made whole. Changing the law under the present facts is grievous error. The decision of the majority is contrary to the rule followed by the Supreme Court as set forth in Carry v Consumers Power Co, supra. Under the guise of "public policy” they have gone beyond judicial interpretation to create a new cause of action without express legislative authority.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.