holding that plagiarism by an attorney in a masters of law thesis violated Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(a)(4)
How later courts described this case
- holding that plagiarism by an attorney in a masters of law thesis violated Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(a)(4)
- recognizing that “[h]onesty is . . . fundamental to the functioning of the legal profession”
- finding plagiarism constitutes deceit under Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
- censuring attorney who plagiarized, verbatim, more than half of his thesis for an advanced degree in law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent’s conduct warrants discipline, the censure imposed seems to me an inadequate response to the deliberate and deceitful nature of respondent’s conduct.
While no two disciplinary cases are completely alike, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275 . See In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7 .) Respondent’s action constituted a purposeful violation of the bar’s fundamental obligation of honesty, and cannot, in my judgment, be equated with the negligent commingling and conversion for which we censured the respondent in In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215 . Rather, the character of respondent’s misconduct more closely resembles a fraudulent misrepresentation which has customarily received a more severe sanction. See In re Nowak (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 279 ; In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382 ; In re Sherre (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 56 .
As noted by the majority, the reasons for which we impose discipline are “to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, to protect the administration of justice from reproach, and to safeguard the public.” (In re LaPinska (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 461, 473 .) I think it clear that respondent’s intentional deceitfulness tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute and, although not perpetrated in the context of an attorney-client relationship, indirectly threatens the administration of justice by undermining public confidence in the integrity of officers of the court. In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382, 391 ; In re Abbamonto (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 93, 98 .
Because of the calculated nature of respondent’s misconduct some suspension seems to me necessary. Since the length of a suspension should bear a close relationship to the harm or risk of harm caused (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276 ), and since respondent’s misconduct did not directly affect any other person, I would think a three-month suspension appropriate.
JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.