Opinion

Jackson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

  • 955 A.2d 728
  • 2008 D.C. App. LEXIS 383
  • 2008 WL 4065782
Court
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Filed
Sep 4, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Nebeker
On the bench
Ruiz, Thompson, Nebeker
Cited by
9 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.9%

―[B]ecause aggravation of a preexisting injury is compensable, it does not matter whether that preexisting injury was itself work related.‖

How later courts described this case

  • ―[B]ecause aggravation of a preexisting injury is compensable, it does not matter whether that preexisting injury was itself work related.‖
  • “[B]eeause aggravation of a preexisting injury is compensable, it does not matter whether that preexisting injury was itself work related.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NEBEKER, Senior Judge,

concurring:

I agree that the ALJ’s conclusions do not “flow rationally from the facts.” Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 929 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C.2007). As the opinion of the court points out, the ALJ’s order is internally inconsistent. The ALJ bases her conclusion that Dr. Yousafs testimony is entitled to limited weight on the ground that petitioner had not provided him with a fulsome medical history. Yet, the ALJ fails to consider and reconcile the fact that during his deposition, Dr. Yousaf is informed of petitioner’s medical history and reaffirms his diagnosis after being informed of her history.

In light of this inconsistency, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings. A “reasonable mind” could not find the record adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion, Giles v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 758 A.2d 522, 524 (D.C.2000), particularly since the treating physician’s opinion is preferred over that of a medical expert retained for purposes of litigation. Hisler v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 950 A.2d 738 , 746 n. 9 (D.C.2008). While the ALJ may reject the opinion of the treating physician, she must give “specific and legitimate reasons for doing so.” *736 Mexicano v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 806 A.2d 198, 205 (D.C.2002) (citing Olson v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 736 A.2d 1032, 1041 (D.C.1999)). Because those reasons are inconsistent with the record in this case, remand is proper. Upchurch v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 628-29 (D.C.2001). 1 Accordingly, I join in the opinion of the court vacating and remanding.

. For example, in Kralick v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 842 A.2d 705, 711 (D.C.2004), this court remanded an agency decision because the rejection of the treating physician’s testimony was "faulty.” In Kralick , the agency discredited the treating physician's opinion because it was not the most recent opinion, which was factually incorrect. Id. In Mexicano, 806 A.2d 198 , this court reversed an agency ruling of non-compensability where its reasons for rejecting the treating physician's diagnosis were "not supported by the record.” Id. at 205-06 . The agency discounted the treating physician’s diagnosis because it was not based on valid assumptions concerning the employee’s medical history. However, the record demonstrated that the treating physician was aware of the salient aspects of the claimant’s medical history. Id. at 206 .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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