stating that even though there was testimony from a deputy police officer and his brother indicating defendant's guilt, which the jury ultimately believed, defendant's maintaining his innocence does not mean that his defense was asserted in bad faith, thereby subjecting the defendant to a more severe penalty because he maintained his innocence and lost
How later courts described this case
- stating that even though there was testimony from a deputy police officer and his brother indicating defendant's guilt, which the jury ultimately believed, defendant's maintaining his innocence does not mean that his defense was asserted in bad faith, thereby subjecting the defendant to a more severe penalty because he maintained his innocence and lost
- observing that the rejection of a defense by the finder of fact based upon corroborating evidence of guilt does not necessarily mean that the defense was asserted in bad faith, that otherwise a defendant “would be subjected to an enhanced penalty whenever he maintained his innocence and lost,” and that there was no indication that the defendant’s assertion of his innocence was in bad faith or amounted to disdain or recalcitrance, and holding that the trial court erred by enhancing the defendant’s sentence on that basis
- holding that the erroneous admission of an affidavit was harmless error because the affidavit was cumulative of unchallenged witness testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*162 MATTINGLY, Judge,
concurring with opinion
I fully concur with the majority that Hollen was not prejudiced by the Deputy's testimony about Hollen's threats or by the admission of cumulative evidence in the form of the Deputy's handwritten notes. However, I write separately to address the majority's suggestion that a trial court considering a sentence enhancement based on aggravating cireumstances is obliged to assign "a specific weight to each aggravator in terms of the proportion of an enhancement." Such an obligation is, I be-leve, inconsistent with our well-established standard of review of sentencing decisions and with the rule that a single aggravator may support an enhanced sentence even if other aggravators are determined to be invalid.
We are routinely involved in the review of sentences, but our standard of review remains highly deferential. While sentencing decisions are not "per se unreachable on appeal," the trial court "is afforded the broadest of discretion in making the sentencing decision within the confines of the statutory limitations." Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind.1983). Appellate courts have the constitutional authority to review and revise sentences, Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4, but will not do so unless the sentence imposed is "manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B); Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ind.2000). The standard is "not whether in our judgment the sentence is unreasonable, but whether it is clearly, plainly, and obviously so." Id., quoting Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 568 , 568 (Ind.1997).
The majority's suggestion that the trial court is obliged to assign to each aggravating factor a specific proportional weight seems to me inconsistent with this broad discretion and inappropriate in light of the inherent complexity of the weighing process. An appellate court will not revise an enhanced sentence where the trial court has found aggravating cireumstances, the sentence is authorized by statute, and the sentence is not manifestly unreasonable: "We are not bound to conduct a de novo review of the sentencing hearing and assess or reweigh the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding aggravating and mitigating cireumstances." Bish v. State, 421 N.E.2d 608, 620 (Ind.1981).
Assigning a proportional weight to each aggravating circumstance could serve only to encourage such inappropriate appellate reweighing and reassessment of the trial court's sentencing decision, and to encourage appeals premised on the trial court's improper assignment of, or failure to assign, proportional weight to the aggravating factors. In light of the Bish holding and the breadth of the trial court's disceretion in sentencing decisions I believe we cannot and should not require the trial court to articulate the proportion by which each aggravating circumstance supported a sentence enhancement.