affirming an award in which the. word “and” was. interpreted in the disjunctive to give effect to the parties’ intent in executing the agreement
How later courts described this case
- affirming an award in which the. word “and” was. interpreted in the disjunctive to give effect to the parties’ intent in executing the agreement
- only where there is manifest disregard of the contract will [the court] disturb the award"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, Justice,
with whom COLLINS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I agree with the court that the case was procedurally arbitrable. In addressing the substance of the arbitration, however, the arbitrators, in direct contravention of Article 13(B)(c) of the collective bargaining agreement, examined the grievance de novo and substituted their judgment for that of the City in overruling the City’s decision to discipline Officer Blanchette. Therefore, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the arbitrator’s construction of the Agreement was plausible, and respectfully dissent.
The standard of judicial review of an arbitrator’s substantive decision is a narrow one, and is correctly stated by the court. In this case, however, Article 13(B)(c) of the Agreement specifically limits the power of the arbitrators to decide cases involving employee discipline by providing that
no arbitrator shall have the power to substitute his or her judgment for that of the City to overrule the decision of the City unless he/she finds that the City acted arbitrarily, in bad faith, without reason and in violation of the specific terms of the agreement.
(Emphasis added).
I agree with the court that the conjunctive word “and” may in certain circumstances be read as a disjunctive “or,” but only when necessary to make sense of the contract. In this case, however, such a reading eviscerates rather than clarifies the limitation placed upon the scope of review and allows the arbitrators to decide *722 this case free from the restraints imposed by Article 13(B)(e).
In my judgment Article 13 of the Agreement is in no way ambiguous. Its purpose is to limit the authority of the arbitrators in their review of the City’s disciplinary actions, and it does so. The arbitrators did not interpret an ambiguous provision; they disregarded a perfectly clear limitation on their authority and, in a de novo fashion, decided the City had failed to convince them as factfinders by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer Blanchette had disclosed confidential information to a criminal suspect. 1 Although the evidence may have permitted a factfinder to conclude that the City had failed in its burden, the arbitrators discounted Article 13 entirely, allowing them to accord no deference to the decision of the City. Such a construction “was not possible under a fair interpretation of the contract....” Westbrook School Comm’n v. Westbrook Teachers Ass’n, 404 A.2d 204, 209 (Me.1979).
I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for entry of a judgment vacating the arbitrators’ award.
. In their opinion the arbitrators conclude that Article 13, limiting their scope of review, "must be discounted as a standard in evaluating actions which resulted in this grievance.” They discuss their "reluctance to give full weight to the various accounts of what [a witness] is reported to have said.” Although they determine that "maybe” the officer disclosed information about an upcoming investigation to the suspect (the finding made by the City), they conclude that "the preponderance of the evidence does not support the City.” These discussions and findings clearly demonstrate that rather than deferring to the credibility judgments made by the City, as Article 13(B)(c) compels them to do, the arbitrators completely ignored Article 13(B)(c) and “substitute[d] [their] judgment for that of the City to overrule the decision of the City....”