holding that public policy is “well defined and dominant[,] ... ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that public policy is “well defined and dominant[,] ... ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.”
- holding that the essence test clearly does not permit the reviewing court "to intrude into the domain of the arbitrator and determine whether an award is 'manifestly unreasonable' "
- emphasizing that the essence test requires more deference than would a "manifestly unreasonable" standard of review and remanding for consideration of narrow public policy exception
- holding to qualify for the sole exception to the essence test, public policy must be well-defined, dominant, and easily referenced in legal precedent
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
In this case, I have some difficulty with the lead Justices’ decision to overrule prior decisions without reference to the *669 doctrine of stare decisis, requiring respect for precedent. In this regard, I agree with the United States Supreme Court’s approach to matters of statutory construction, which recognizes that legislative bodies are in the best position to address judicial holdings with which they disagree, and thus, accords stare decisis “special force.” See Shambach v. Bickhart, 577 Pa. 384, 406 , 845 A.2d 793, 807 (2004) (Saylor, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 , 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)); cf. In re Burtt’s Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 231 , 44 A.2d 670, 677 (1945) (“A statutory construction, once made and followed, should never be altered upon the changed views of new personnel of the court.”).
Nevertheless, although I certainly understand the concerns that led majorities of this Court to adopt the core functions doctrine in the context of the otherwise deferential essence test, I believe that the Court has remained unsuccessful in the attempt to reconcile that doctrine with a reasoned application of the essence test. See Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 578 Pa. 347, 364-65 , 852 A.2d 299, 310 (2004) (Saylor, J., concurring). Thus, I support the present holding, because I believe that the circumstances meet a narrow exception to the requirement to adhere to precedent. See Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 136 , 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975). 1
Further, I have no objection to the separate adoption of a public policy exception to the essence test, in alignment with federal jurisprudence, with the understanding that the exception is exceptionally narrow, consistent with this Court’s prior explanations. See Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 563 , 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (1998) (“As the term ‘public policy’ is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of [an award] as contrary to that policy ... Only dominant public policy *670 would justify such action. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare [an award] ... contrary to public policy.” (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 538 Pa. 337, 347-48 , 648 A.2d 755, 760 (1994))).
. Indeed, unlike the present lead opinion, the Court in Greene County did not classify the core functions doctrine as an exception to the essence test, but rather, couched the analysis in terms of whether the arbitration award rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. See Greene County, 578 Pa. at 362 , 852 A.2d at 309 .